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This dissertation explores the agency problems 
of REITs caused by the conflicts of interest between the 
REIT sponsor and the REIT shareholders. It also tests the 
impact of the agency problems on the pricing of REIT 
initial public offerings (IPOs) and on the valuation 
effects of secondary debt and equity offerings. Like the 
IPOs of ordinary corporations, REIT IPOs are also 
underpriced; however, the magnitude of the underpricing is 
far lower than that of the IPOs for ordinary corporations. 
Captive REITs have greater underpricing in IPOs than non­
captive REITs. REIT secondary equity offerings exhibit 
negative announcement effects, while secondary debt 
offerings show no announcement effects. Captive REITs do 
not have significantly different valuation effects for 





There exists a substantial body of literature 
dealing with captive-financing arrangements (e.g., 
captive-financing subsidiaries and captive insurance 
companies). This literature has identified three 
motivations for these arrangements: improving operational 
efficiency, enhancing debt capacity and transferring 
wealth between equity-holders and bond-holders. Andrew 
(1961, 1964) discusses the potential operating 
improvements attributable to a captive- financing 
subsidiary. Roberts and Viscione (1981) conclude that 
captive formation does enhance debt capacity. Kim, 
McConnell and Greenwood (1977) argue that forming a 
captive-financing subsidiary violates "me-first" rules for 
the parent company's bondholders and results in a wealth 
transfer from the bondholders to shareholders. The 
general conclusion for this literature is that the parent 
companies' shareholders gain by forming a captive- 
financing firm.
One type of cs.ptive-financing arrangement that has 
received little attention is the real estate investment 
trust (REIT). REITs often are created as captive- 
financing affiliates by their sponsors, e.g., a sponsor 
may find it advantageous to form a REIT and use the REIT
1
to obtain debt and equity capital at a price lower than 
elsewhere obtainable. For example, Indianapolis based 
Melvin Simon & Associates founded MSA Realty Corporation 
in 1984 to obtain cheaper financing for its construction 
projects in return for providing the REIT management 
skills and experience in real estate.1
The formation of captive REITs create conflict of 
interest problems between the sponsors/managers and the 
shareholders of REITs. The classic agency literature 
postulates that there exists an equilibrium contractual 
form between the agents and the principals which gives 
optimal incentives to the agents to maximize the 
principal's wealth given incomplete monitoring. The 
positive agency theory advanced by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) first identifies three types of agency cost born by 
both the agent and the principal2 and second postulates 
that agency cost is a reduction of firm value which can be 
minimized by appropriate ownership (capital) structure. 
REITs' unique type of agency cost incurred by the 
conflicts of interest between sponsors/managers and 
shareholders alone can lower the REITs' value.
Agency costs have also been shown to affect the 
market reaction to security offerings. The pricing of
1See, Ross and Klein, 1986.
2The three types of agency cost are l)the principal's 
monitoring expenditures, 2)the agent's bonding 
expenditures, and 3)the residual loss.
security offerings, initial and secondary, reflects the 
market assessment (or the change in the market assessment) 
of firm value. The general consensus on the underpricing 
of initial public offerings (IPOs) is that underpricing is 
caused by information asymmetry between the informed 
investors (including the issuer) and uninformed investors 
(including underwriters) about the value of the underlying 
issue.3 If there is uncertainty about the agency cost of 
the underlying firm, then there is added uncertainty about 
firm value. This uncertainty about firm value can drive 
the underpricing of IPOs.
The financial literature has documented two sources 
of valuation effects of secondary security offerings: 1) 
valuation effects resulting from the change in capital 
structure by secondary offerings, and 2) valuation effects 
due to the mitigation of information asymmetry problems by 
using secondary offerings as signalling mechanisms. The 
general observation is that offerings which decrease the 
leverage ratio result in value reduction and offerings 
which increase the leverage ratio do not significantly 
affect firm value (Smith (1986)). The change in leverage 
ratio influences a firm's bonding activity and hence 
affects the agency costs of a firm (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), and Jensen (1986)). Thus secondary security 
offerings can affect firm value via changes in agency
3See, for example, Beatty and Ritter, 1986.
cost.
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore how 
the agency cost caused by the captive-financing nature of 
REITs affects firm value through empirical investigations 
of the pricing of initial public offerings and secondary 
security offerings of REITs. For REIT IPOs, there is an 
information asymmetry about the REITs' degree of captivity 
between informed and uninformed investors. This 
information asymmetry constitutes an uncertainty about the 
agency cost (and hence the firm value) attributable to 
this captive nature. This uncertainty, perceived by 
investors, will contribute to the underpricing of REIT 
IPOs. Using this line of reasoning, this study 
empirically tests the following hypothesis: captive REITs 
have greater underpricing in their IPOs than non-captive 
ones.
The general finding about the wealth effect of the 
announcement of secondary equity and debt offerings is 
that the former has negative wealth effects and the latter 
has zero effect. For REITs, however, positive debt 
announcement effects are detected (Howe and Shilling, 
(1988)). The agency problem arising from the captive- 
financing nature of REITs could be the cause of this 
anomalous finding. Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) 
point out specifically that debt financing provides a 
mechanism to monitor the management of a firm and hence
reduces agency cost. This monitoring mechanism could be 
particularly valuable given this unique type of agency 
cost for REITs and cause positive announcement effects. 
Along this line of reasoning, the following hypothesis is 
tested in this study: the stock price of captive REITs 
reacts more favorably to debt announcements than that of 
non-captive REITs.
Conversely, secondary equity offerings reduce the 
leverage ratio and hence decrease the degree of monitoring 
by debt-holders. This results in a larger agency cost and 
decreases firm value. This argument predicts a negative 
equity announcement effect for REITs which is consistent 
with Howe and Shilling's findings (1988). In particular, 
decreased monitoring also results in a smaller constraint 
on management's activities and may increase the agency 
cost associated with the captive financing nature of 
REITs. Thus this dissertation also tests the following 
hypothesis: the stock price of captive REITs reacts more 
unfavorably to equity announcements than that of non­
captive REITs.
In summary, this dissertation analyzes and 
empirically investigates a specific type of agency problem 
for REITs which is inherent in the REITs' captive- 
financing arrangement. The contributions of this 
dissertation are: 1) it leads to more understanding of the 
nature of REITs; 2) it develops a framework to test agency
cost; 3) it helps us to discriminate between competing 
theories of the pricing of IPOs and secondary offerings, 
and 4) it extends the agency cost literature by 
introducing a new factor, the sponsor, into the 
contracting relationship among individuals.
The remainder of this research is organized as 
follows: Chapter II introduces the institutional 
characteristics of REITs to serve as the background of 
this dissertation, focusing on the captive financing 
nature of REITs. Chapter III develops the hypothesis for 
REIT IPOs and secondary offerings. Chapter IV empirically 
investigates the pricing of REIT IPOs, focusing on the 
influence of REITs' captive nature. Chapter V empirically 
examines the wealth effect of REIT debt offerings.
Chapter VI empirically examines the wealth effect of REIT 
secondary equity offerings. The investigations in both 
Chapter V and Chapter VI also focus on the influence of 





This chapter provides an overview of REITs. A REIT 
typically invests in mortgages or commercial and 
residential real estate (e.g., office buildings, shopping 
centers, and large residential complexes). REIT shares 
are traded in the stock market much like corporate common 
stock, which allows investors with limited capital to 
take advantage of the benefits of real estate (e.g., 
diversification). Overall, use of the REIT form of 
ownership allows shareholders to avoid double taxation of 
dividends (since the conduit tax treatment exempts REITs 
from corporate taxes, given that REITs successfully 
comply with the tax code). This tax treatment greatly 
affects the cash flow pattern for REITs, and dividend and 
capital structure decisions.4
REITs can be categorized into non-captive REITs and 
captive REITs. Non-captive REITs are formed for many of 
the same reasons as financial intermediaries, while
4For a discussion of the impact of the tax treatment 
on REIT dividend decisions, see REIT Fact Book 1988 and 
Tax Management-Real Estate Investment Trusts, 107-5th 
edition. For a discussion of the impact of the tax 
treatment on REIT capital structure decisions, see Howe 
and Shilling (1988).
7
captive REITs are formed by their sponsors to serve the 
sponsor's financial needs. The captive-financing nature 
of REITs provides a unique opportunity to investigate 




The organizational structure of a non-captive REIT 
is essentially the same as an ordinary corporation except 
that by law, they have to contract with an outside 
advisor/manager. The organizational environment of a 
non-captive REIT is formed by the contractual 
relationships among the sponsor, advisor, board of 
trustees (directors), asset managers, and the REIT 
shareholders, which can be depicted in Figure 1.
The REIT's sponsor is the entity which initiates 
the formation of the trust. In addition, the sponsor 
puts the reputation of its organization on the line for 
the REIT and usually provides financing and other 
services to the REIT.5 The commonly observed sponsors 
are developers, bankers, and insurance companies.
Real estate interests in REIT portfolios are 
selected and managed by professional investment advisors.
5See, REIT Fact Book 1988, page LVII.
These advisors are selected and periodically reviewed by 
a board of trustees or directors, who are elected by the 
shareholders.
The contractual relationship between the REIT and 
the advisor is set forth in the advisory agreement. The 
advisor is responsible for originating, holding, and 
disposing of the REIT's investments. Also, the advisor 
administers the REIT's day-to-day operations, supervises 
relationships with business counterparts, and maintains 
shareholder relations. For equity REITs, the advisor has 
the responsibility of overseeing the property managers' 
performance.6 The advisory compensation scheme has a 
complicated structure which usually includes acquisition 
and origination fees, administrative services fees, asset 
management fees, and incentive participation fees.7
A REIT's board of trustees is consists of at least 
three trustees, a majority of which must be independent 
in the sense that they are unaffiliated with the REIT's 
sponsor/advisor. The board of trustees establishes 
written policies on the REIT's investment and financing 
policies, and monitors the advisor to assure that such 
policies are properly carried out.8 Trustees are
6See, REIT Fact Book 1988, page XLIV.
7The incentive participation fee is a share of the 
REIT's residual profit (see, Jarchow (1988)).
8See, REIT Fact Book 1988, page XXXii.
compensated by trustee fees.
Asset managers are part of the REIT organizational 
structure. Equity REITs are prohibited from managing 
directly their properties, thus outside property managers 
must be hired. The property managers are supervised by 
the REIT's advisor and their services are usually 
compensated by a percentage of gross rental income.9
REIT shareholders exercise their powers under the 
governing documents of the REIT. Shareholders elect 
trustees (directors), approve the advisory agreement, and 
endorse or reject proposed amendments to the declaration 
of trust. Thus shareholders have the ultimate control 
over the REIT. Shareholders receive dividends and capital 
gains as compensation for taking the risk of REIT 
operations.
A non-captive REIT is operationally independent 
from the sponsor and the advisor, and the board of 
trustees' decision making is not affected by the sponsor 
and the advisor. In the extreme case, the sponsor's 
interest is perfectly aligned with the REIT shareholders, 
which theoretically minimizes the REIT's agency costs 
caused by the separation of management and ownership.
B. Reasons for Non-Captive REIT Formation
Non-captive REITs may be formed to facilitate the
9See, REIT Fact Book 1988, page 24.
redeployment of assets to their highest valued uses and 
for reasons which are commonly attributable to the 
existence of financial intermediaries, such as 
divisibility and transactions cost savings/professional 
management.
1. Redeployment of Assets to Their Highest Valued Uses
The increased REIT value due to the conduit tax 
treatment10 given to trust earnings may be one of the 
major reasons for the selection of the REIT form. REITs 
are not taxed at the corporate level if they meet certain 
income, distribution and asset tests, as set forth by the 
Internal Revenue code. These tests generally require 
that REITs must distribute virtually all taxable income 
to shareholders and invest at least 75 percent of total 
assets in real estate and real estate-related assets.11
10The Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960.
11The distribution test requires that REITs must 
distribute at least 95% of taxable income excluding 
capital gains. The asset test requires that REITs must 
invest at least 75% of total assets in real estate 
assets, cash, cash items and government securities. The 
income test includes two major requirements: 1) at least 
75% of a REIT's gross income must be generated from 
interests on mortgage lending, rents from real property, 
gains from the sale of real property, abatements and 
refunds of property taxes, gains or dividends from 
holding other qualified REITs' shares and mortgage or 
purchase commitment fees, and 2) REITs are prohibited 
from generating more than 30% of gross income from the 
sale or disposition of real property held for less than 
four years and securities held for less than six months 
(see, REIT Fact Book, 1988).
Another major restriction is that REITs must 
maintain a diffuse ownership structure. In order that 
the REIT not be deemed a "personal holding company," more 
than fifty percent of the value of its outstanding shares 
may not be owned, directly or indirectly, by five or 
fewer individuals at any time during the last half of the 
entity's taxable year.12
The exemption from corporate taxation makes the 
REIT form of ownership a potentially attractive way to 
invest in real estate. However, since REITs do not pay 
corporate taxes, interest expenses do not provide tax 
savings and neither do other "tax shields substitutes" 
such as depreciation and investment tax credits.
The exemption from taxation at the corporate level 
also has implications for REIT capital structure. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) show that the value of a 
levered firm is the value of the firm when it is 
unlevered plus the gain from leverage which is equal to 
the effective tax rate times the total market value of 
the debt. Thus firm value is an increasing function of 
debt financing, and the higher the effective tax rate, 
the greater the tax gains. When a firm reaches 100 
percent debt financing, the gain from leverage is
12See, Derenthal (1985). In addition, the REIT 
shares must be held by 100 or more persons during at 
least 335 days of a taxable year of twelve months or 
during a proportionate part of a taxable year of less 
than twelve months.
maximized, and the optimal capital structure is reached.
REITs, on the other hand, have zero gain from 
leverage since they pay no corporate taxes. This is 
because, according to MM, the value of a levered firm 
with a zero corporate tax rate is equal to the value of 
the firm when it is not levered. Thus the MM theory does 
not suggest an optimal capital structure for REITs.
In the Miller model (1977), the disadvantage of 
personal income tax exactly offsets the tax advantage of 
corporate borrowing when the firm pays the full statutory 
tax rate. This is because in equilibrium, the cost of 
debt (and, the required rate of return on the debt) would 
be equal to the rate paid by tax-free institutions 
divided by one minus the full statutory tax rate. If a 
firm pays tax at a rate lower than the statutory rate, it 
would suffer a loss in borrowing since the tax gain from 
leverage would be less than the cost of the debt. With a 
zero corporate tax rate, a REIT's loss by debt financing 
is maximized. Since REITs must pay a competitive 
interest rate without enjoying tax savings for debt 
financing, the static trade-off theory (Myers (1984) )13 
predicts an all-equity capital structure for REITs (Howe 
and Shilling (1988)). Based on the above tax-related
13The static trade-off theory maintains that a 
firm's capital structure decision is a result of the 
trade-off between tax savings and potential 
bankruptcy/agency costs associated with the debt.
arguments, the optimal capital structure for REITs seems 
to be 100 percent equity.
In the case that a REIT has net operating losses, 
the REIT can not pass through the losses to the 
shareholders; in other words, REIT shareholders cannot 
deduct REIT losses on their individual income tax 
returns. As a result, the net cash flow position for an 
individual investing in REIT shares could be quite 
volatile since he receives 95 percent of the REIT's 
earnings as dividends in "good years" and receives no tax 
advantage by offsetting the REIT losses in "bad years."
In summary, the typical advantage for a REIT to 
become qualified is the exemption from corporate 
taxation. However, being qualified subjects a REIT to 
several disadvantages, which are: 1) the possible losses 
in firm value due to the restrictions set forth by 
income, asset, and distribution tests, 2) the losses in 
savings from the tax shields including depreciation, 
depletion, and investment tax credits, and 3) the 
possible losses at the individual level due to the fact 
that a REIT can not pass through its net operating losses 
to its shareholders. For a REIT to obtain tax exemption 
to realize the redeployment of assets to their highest 
valued uses, the advantages must outweigh the 
disadvantages.
2. Divisibility
Klein (1973) points out that indivisibility alone 
can explain the formation of financial intermediaries. 
Klein's argument is that the number of obtainable points 
in the mean-variance space is an increasing function of 
an investor's scale of wealth so that there is an 
incentive for the pooling of funds. The larger the 
number of obtainable points in the mean-variance space, 
the higher the possibility for an investor to reach an 
indifference curve of higher utility. The pooling of 
funds can then be broken down into small denomination by 
taking a corporate form of organization.
REITs pool large amounts of funds from investors, 
purchase large blocks of real estate assets, combine 
these assets in portfolios, and provide divisibility by 
selling claims of small denomination on the portfolio. 
The divisibility in real estate may be particularly 
desirable for investors due to the typical "large 
financial commitment" in real estate investment (See, 
REIT Fact Book 1988, Chapter I).
3. Transactions Cost Savings/Professional Management
Klein (1973) argues that if there are no 
transactions costs, firms will issue perfectly divisible 
securities to maximize their market value. However, in 
an imperfect world, a firm must tradeoff between
transactions costs and divisibility.
As argued by Benston and Smith (1976), the 
existence of any financial intermediary must be a 
consequence of transactions costs.14 In the presence of 
transactions costs and other forms of market friction, an 
opportunity exists for the creation of specialized 
financial instruments and other intermediary services.
The demand for such services exists when the marginal 
benefit of reduced transactions costs outweigh the 
marginal cost of obtaining service. Ingersoll (1976) 
contends that for financial intermediaries such as 
closed-end funds, investors gain when the benefits from 
economies of scale in transactions cost outweigh the 
management fee costs to the investors. Being financial 
intermediaries, REITs may be able to invest at a much 
lower transactions cost due to economies of scale and due 
to professional management than could be achieved by 
individual investors.
In summary, REITs can be formed for the reason of 
tax saving and for the same generally given reasons for 
financial intermediaries, including divisibility, and 
transactions cost saving/professional management. Aside 
from these reasons, REITs may also be formed as a
14Benston and Smith view the role of financial 
intermediaries as creating specialized financial 
commodities and an individual can maximize his utility by 
acquiring financial commodities to transfer his 
consumption inter and intra-temporally.
captive-financing vehicle to the sponsor in order to 
serve the sponsor's financial needs.
Ill: Captive REITs
A. Organizational Structure
The organizational structure of a captive REIT is 
depicted in Figure 2. The participants in this 
organizational structure are the same as those in the 
organizational structure of a non-captive REIT. However, 
in addition to those relationships among the participants 
in the organizational structure of a non-captive REIT, 
some control relationships exist in the organizational 
structure of a captive REIT. First, in a captive REIT, 
the sponsor maintains control over the REIT's assets, 
either directly by staying on as advisor or indirectly by 
forming a wholly-owned subsidiary to serve as the REIT's 
advisor.15 This arrangement virtually assures that the 
REIT's operation conforms to the sponsor's interests.
The advisor is basically responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the REIT and is also the planner and 
executor of the investment policy of the REIT. Thus, the 
advisor is an important position for the sponsor to hold,
15For example, Connecticut General Life Insurance 
Co. created Congen Realty Advisory Co. to advise 
Connecticut General Mortgage and Realty Investments (see 
the 10-k report of Connecticut General Mortgage and 
Realty Investments).
either directly or indirectly.
Second, a sponsor may direct the board of trustees' 
approval on investment policy through its influence on 
both affiliated and "independent" trustees. Having 
control of the board of trustees is desirable since the 
board of trustees approves investment policy made by the 
advisor. Third, the sponsor may form several management 
firms to serve as the REIT's asset managers or form the 
management firms through its wholly owned advisor firm.
The REIT shareholders are still the ultimate 
controllers of the firm; however, the REIT's operations 
can be greatly influenced by the sponsor, given the 
sponsor's control over the advisor, asset managers, and 
the board of trustees. The degree of captivity of the 
REIT depends on the extent to which the sponsor controls 
the advisor, the board of trustees, and the management 
firms, such that he is able to direct the REIT's 
operation to conform to his interests.
B. Reasons for Formation
There exists a substantial body of literature 
dealing with captive-financing arrangements. Often the 
sponsoring corporation (the sponsor) forms a subsidiary 
to extend his business.16 For example, General Motors
16In some cases, the subsidiary is allowed to have a 
business relationship with other independent business 
organizations.
formed General Motors Acceptance Corporation to provide 
inventory financing for its car dealers. The subsidiary 
is wholly-owned by the sponsor. This literature has 
discussed three motivations for captive-financing 
arrangements: improving operational efficiency, enhancing 
debt capacity and transferring wealth between equity- 
holders and bond-holders. Andrew (1961, 1964) contends 
that captives are unnecessary. His analysis shows that 
segregating the financing department into a captive does 
not isolate the financing decisions from other decisions 
any more than a separate unit in the parent company 
would, thus forming a captive does not increase 
efficiency in this sense.
There are three major arguments for a change in 
debt capacity due to the formation of a captive 
subsidiary. First, Lewellen (1972) argues that forming a 
captive-financing subsidiary may increase the probability 
of default in parent company's debt obligations. This is 
because the separation of cash flows and debt obligations 
reduces the opportunity to use a cash surplus in one to 
cover a deficit in the other, thus reducing debt 
capacity. Second, Dipchand, Roberts, and Viscione (1982) 
contend that segregating the financing department into a 
captive subsidiary can lower the agency costs associated
with debt financing17 and hence increase debt capacity. 
Third, Roberts and Viscione (1981) note that forming a 
captive subsidiary is a movement toward multidivisional 
form (M-Form) of organizational structure, which improves 
the control and decision making processes. These changes 
in turn, increase overall efficiency and debt capacity.
Kim, McConnell and Greenwood (1977) argue that 
forming a captive-financing subsidiary is a violation of 
"me-first" rule because the captive's creditors are paid 
off by the captive's cash flows and become superior to 
the bondholders in the sponsoring company. Thus a wealth 
transfer from the sponsoring firm's bondholders to 
stockholders can result.
In many cases, REITs are also used as a captive- 
financing vehicle. For example, Public Storage, Inc. 
(PSI) created a real estate investment trust, Storage 
Properties, Inc., to provide first mortgage loans to its 
wholly-owned subsidiary for the purpose of developing new 
mini-warehouses throughout the United States.18 Melvin 
Simon & Associates founded MSA Realty Corporation to 
obtain cheaper financing for its construction projects in 
return for providing the REIT management skills and 
experience in real estate (Ross and Klein, 1986).
17According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), debt 
financing incurs monitoring and bonding costs.
18See, "The Mortgage and Real Estate Executive 
Report," September 1, 1989, Vol. 22, No. 13, p 3.
The possible conflicts of interest between the 
sponsor and the REIT are exacerbated when it is formed 
for captive financing. The conflicts of interest result 
in various agency problems. For example, a REIT might 
pay more to acquire properties from its sponsor or 
advisor than it would pay an independent third party 
(Rosenberg (1986)). A REIT might provide financing to 
its affiliates at lower costs than other conventional 
sources would (Ross and Klein (1986)). A Wall Street 
Journal article notes that "... some REITs are advised by 
developers who may use them to unload properties at high 
prices."19 A recent example of the possible conflicts of 
interest is also offered by the Wall Street Journal.
The shareholders of VMS Mortgage Investment Fund (a REIT) 
filed a lawsuit against its sponsors and affiliates. The 
suit alleged that extensive conflicts of interest among 
VMS Mortgage Investment Fund and its affiliates existed 
such that the trust's loans to its affiliates "didn't 
approximate arms-length business transactions.1,20 These 
agency problems reduce the REIT's net cash flow and hence 
lower the dividend payout level, which in turn, lowers 
the firm value.
19Wall street Journal, "Finding Real Estate 
Opportunities Despite Recent Woes of Market," August 28, 
1989.
20See Wall Street Journal. "VMS Realty, Owners Are 
Accused in Suit Over Sales of Shares," January 12, 1990.
The financial literature has identified many 
sources of agency problems, such as the perk consumption 
problems of equity capital21 and risk incentive,22 
investment incentive problems23 of debt capital. Given 
these agency problems, agency costs are created by 
claimholders' monitoring activities, the agent's bonding 
activities, and the firm's residual loss (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). The agency problems caused by the 
conflicts of interest between the captive (the REIT) and 
its sponsor/advisor has not been discussed in the 
literature. These agency problems can also create agency 
costs for captive REITs.
The severity of these agency problems, and hence 
the magnitude of the agency cost, not only depends on the 
degree of captivity of the REIT but also depends on the 
ownership structure of the REIT. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), a firm's agency cost is a decreasing 
function of the manager's ownership of the firm's shares. 
If the sponsor/advisor owns a substantial share of the 
REIT's common stock, it may provide an offsetting force 
to reduce the agency cost incurred by the captive nature
21See, Jensen and Meckling (1976).
2Stockholders have the incentive to bear 
unwarranted risk and transfer debtholders' wealth to 
themselves.
2Stockholders have the incentive to forgo 
profitable investments when the investment opportunity is 
entirely supported by debt (see, Myers (1977)).
of REITs. Thus the degree of captivity of a REIT can 
vary widely. One extreme is that the REIT is 
operationally independent from the sponsor and the 
advisor, the board of trustees' decision making is not 
affected by the sponsor and the advisor, and the 
sponsor/advisor's interest is perfectly aligned with the 
REIT shareholders. Another extreme is that the sponsor 
has absolute control of the advisor, the board of 
trustees, and the property managers (for equity REITs), 
and owns no share of the REIT. The higher the degree of 
captivity of the REIT, the greater the magnitude of 
potential agency problems. This in turn, causes a higher 
uncertainty in firm value due to the higher uncertainty 
in agency cost associated with those agency problems.
C. Implications
1. Debt Capacity
Since REITs are operationally and legally separated 
from their sponsors, the Lewellen reverse co-insurance 
argument may be applicable to REITs and their sponsors. 
From the agency cost point of view, whether financing 
from the captive REIT results in higher (lower) agency 
costs associated with debt financing or not is not clear. 
Thus whether forming a captive REIT increases the 
sponsor's debt capacity or not is not clear either. Also 
since a captive REIT is not wholly owned by its sponsor,
Roberts and Viscione's M-form argument may not be 
applicable to REITs. Thus overall, the implications from 
the existing literature about the debt capacity issue is 
not clear for captive REITs and their sponsors.
2. Wealth Transfer
As noted earlier that Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood 
(1977) find a wealth transfer from bondholders to 
stockholders by forming a captive-financing subsidiary. 
They argue that this is due to the violation of "me- 
first" rule. This result is challenged by Malitz (1989). 
She finds that after forming a captive, shareholders gain 
far more than bondholders lose, and firm value increases 
significantly. Thus wealth transfer can not completely 
explain the gain to shareholders.
The wealth transfer argument may be applicable to 
the sponsor of a captive REIT. However, given the 
controversial evidence in the literature, the wealth 
transfer argument needs further development to draw the 
implications for REITs.
3. The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
The financial literature postulates that 
"uncertainty" characterizes the pricing of IPOs. Beatty 
and Ritter (1986) argues that the greater the ex ante 
uncertainty about the value of a new issue, the larger
the underpricing. Uncertainties cause information 
asymmetry between different market participants. Rock 
(1986) argues that underpricing is an equilibrium 
solution when information asymmetry exists between 
informed and uninformed investors.
As discussed earlier, there is a specific type of 
agency cost incurred by the captive nature of REITs. If 
there is an uncertainty in the captivity of the REIT at 
the stage of initial public offerings, there is an 
uncertainty about the magnitude of this agency cost.
This in turn creates uncertainty about firm value and 
causes underpricing in IPOs. The valuation effects of 
captive financing on initial public offerings has not 
been addressed in the literature and will be further 
explored in later chapters.
4. The Valuation Effects of Secondary Security Offerings
Several theories have been advanced to predict the 
valuation effects of debt or equity issuances. These 
theories generally focus on either 1) the valuation 
effect of changes in leverage,24 or 2) the effects of 
information asymmetry/signalling on firm value.25 
However, given the potentially more severe agency
24See, for example, Modigliani and Miller (1963),
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980).
25See, for example, Myers and Majluf (1984), Miller 
and Rock (1985), and Ross (1977).
problems for REITs due to captive financing, agency 
related arguments may be more relevant to REIT capital 
structure decisions and valuation effects of security 
offerings. In particular, the change in monitoring from 
creditors, due to the change in capital structure, may 
have important valuation effects for REITs. Easterbrook 
(1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that a firm may prefer to 
venture frequently to the capital market, such as through 
issuing debt, since it provides a mechanism to monitor 
the management of the firm and hence reduces agency 
problems.
REITs must maintain a diffuse ownership structure 
to comply with the tax code. A diffuse ownership 
structure theoretically makes monitoring of the agency 
relationship between agents and principals more 
difficult. Fama (1980) notes that modern portfolio 
theory tells us that the optimal investment strategy for 
an investor is to diversify across the securities of many 
firms, and since an investor's wealth would not depend 
too much on any particular firm, "an individual security 
holder generally has no special interest in personally 
overseeing the detailed activities of any firm." Given 
the diffuse ownership structure, monitoring from 
creditors may be particularly valuable for REITs.
It is discussed earlier that based on the tax- 
related capital structure theory, the optimal capital
structure for REITs seems to be 100 percent equity. 
Contrary to this prediction, the employment of debt 
financing by REITs is commonly observed. Given the 
captive financing nature of REITs, the necessity of 
monitoring by creditors can explain the non-zero leverage 
ratio for REITs. In addition, ceteris paribus, one 
should observe that on average captive REITs have a 
higher leverage ratio than non-captive REITs.
The above line of reasoning predicts a positive 
debt announcement effect and a negative equity 
announcement effect for REITs since equity issues 
relatively reduce monitoring from creditors, which are 
consistent with Howe and Shilling's findings (1988).
The captive-financing literature has not yet 
addressed the valuation effects of a captive firm's 
security offerings. This issue will be explored in later 
chapters using REIT debt and equity announcements.
IV: Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of REITs. Non­
captive REITs may be formed for several reasons such as 
the redeployment of assets to their highest valued use. 
They may also be formed due to the benefits provided to 
investors, such as divisibility and transactions cost 
savings/professional management.
One major aspect of REITs that has not been
investigated is their captive-financing nature. The 
degree of captivity is maximized when the sponsor has 
absolute control of the advisor, the board of trustees of 
the REIT, and the asset managers, and the sponsor has no 
ownership interest on the REIT. The possible conflicts 
of interest between the sponsor and the REIT may create 
agency problems for the REIT. The agency problems, in 
turn, create agency costs. The diffuse ownership 
structure of REITs makes monitoring of management 
difficult. Thus monitoring from creditors may be 
particularly valuable for REITs. The higher the degree 
of captivity of the REIT, the greater the magnitude of 
potential agency problems. This in turn, causes a higher 
uncertainty in firm value due to the higher uncertainty 
in agency cost associated with those agency problems.
The captive nature of REITs has important 
implications for REIT pricing of initial public 
offerings, valuation effects of secondary security 
offerings, and capital structure. No clear implications 
can be drawn from the literature about the change in debt 




In this chapter, the hypotheses for the pricing of 
REIT IPOs and for the valuation effects of REIT secondary 
security offerings are generated.
The theoretical literature on IPOs argues that 
underpricing is caused by uncertainties about the value 
of the underlying issue, and the greater the uncertainty, 
the larger the underpricing. :.s we saw in Chapter II, 
REITs are often formed as captive-financing affiliates by 
the sponsor. The conflicts of interests between the 
sponsor and the REIT create agency problems, and hence 
agency costs to the REIT. The higher the degree of 
captivity of the REIT, the greater the magnitude of 
potential agency problems. This in turn causes higher 
uncertainty in firm value. This uncertainty in firm 
value may be reflected in the pricing of IPOs. It is 
thus hypothesized that captive REITs have larger 
underpricing in IPOs than non-captive REITs.
Secondary security offerings can affect firm value 
via changes in agency costs. Given the agency problems 
caused by REITs' unique captive-financing nature, 
monitoring from creditors may be particularly valuable
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for REITs. Using this line of reasoning, it is 
hypothesized that the stock price of captive REITs reacts 
more favorably to debt announcements and more unfavorably 
to equity announcements than that of non-captive REITs.
II: Pricing of REIT IPOs
A. Background
An REIT initial public offering follows several 
steps. The sponsor must first consult with several 
potential underwriters about the plan of the offering. 
Once the underwriter(s) is (are) chosen and the offering 
plan is devised, the sponsor must choose lawyers, 
accountants, and other consultants for the offering. The 
registration statement (including a prospectus) of the 
offering is then filed with the SEC. Once the offering 
is approved by the SEC and the registration statement is 
in effect, the underwriter announces the public sale of 
the new issue and the selling period begins. The 
offering price of the new issue is set before the selling 
period begins and can not be changed during the selling 
period. Several states require that the subscription 
proceeds be deposited in an escrow account until a 
specified amount has been received. If the specified 
amount is not received within a specified period, the 
offering is cancelled and the proceeds are returned to
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investors. If the specified amount is reached, the 
subscription proceeds are released from the escrow 
account to the REIT.
The offering contract can be either a firm 
commitment or a best effort. Under the firm commitment 
contract, the underwriter purchases the whole issue from 
the issuer and then sells it to investors at a set price. 
Under the best effort contract, the underwriter acts only 
as a marketing agent for the issuer and is compensated by 
a predetermined spread. Once the selling is in its final 
stage, documentation of the closing of the offering must 
be prepared and finalized. Once the offering is closed, 
the new issue can be traded on an exchange according to 
the agreement between the sponsor and the exchange.
Typically the literature compares the closing price of 
the first trading day with the offering price.
Underpricing results when the first trading day closing 
price is higher than the offering price.
B. Hypothesis
Initial public offerings are different from 
secondary offerings in the sense that the uncertainty 
about the market clearing price of the offering is 
greater than for secondary offerings. The IPO literature 
postulates that uncertainties characterize the pricing of 
IPOs. In other words, IPOs are underpriced due to the
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
market participants about the true value of the 
underlying firm.
Several authors, including Ibbotson (1975), Ritter
(1984), and Chalk and Peavy (1987) have provided 
convincing evidence that initial public offerings are, on 
average, underpriced (for non-REITs). Several models 
have been developed to explain the pricing behavior of 
IPOs. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the greater 
the ex ante uncertainty about the value of a new issue, 
the larger the underpricing; in other word, underpricing 
is a result of investor risk aversion.
Given the uncertainty described by Beatty and 
Ritter, information asymmetry exists between informed and 
uninformed investors about the true value of the 
underlying issue. Rock (1986) models the equilibrium 
pricing of IPOs given both informed and uninformed 
investors in the market. The informed investors submit 
bids only when the offering is not overpriced; on the 
other hand, the uninformed investors face the risk of 
buying the overpriced offerings. As a result, uninformed 
investors anticipate this adverse selection and bid only 
if the offering price is below their expected aftermarket 
price by enough to compensate for their expected losses 
on overpriced issues.
Tinic (1988) points out that underpricing can be
deemed as a compensation to investors for the cost of 
becoming informed. If there is a positive relationship 
between the degree of uncertainty and the amount of 
expenditure required to become informed, higher 
uncertainty offerings must be underpriced more than lower 
uncertainty ones to compensate for the higher information 
cost. Thus the degree of underpricing reflects the 
degree of uncertainty, which is consistent with the 
Beatty and Ritter risk-averse investor argument.
The common theme about IPO pricing is that 
uncertainties about the value of the new issue cause 
information asymmetry between different market 
participants, and information asymmetry in turn, causes 
underpricing in IPOs. These uncertainty arguments have 
important implications for REIT IPO pricing. Chapter II 
discussed the conflicts of interest that exist between 
the REIT sponsor and the REIT for captive REITs, and the 
resulting agency problems. The higher the degree of 
captivity of the REIT, the greater the magnitude of 
potential agency problems. This, in turn, causes a 
higher uncertainty in firm value due to the higher 
uncertainty in agency cost associated with those agency 
problems. Following the literature, the higher 
uncertainty in firm value due to the higher uncertainty 
in agency costs will yield a larger underpricing in the 
IPO. Using this line of reasoning, the following
hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis 1:
Captive REITs have greater underpricing in IPOs 
than non-captive REITs.
Ill: The Valuation Effects of REIT 
Secondary Security offerings
A . Background
Secondary equity and debt offerings follow the same 
process. Different from initial public offerings, a 
secondary equity or debt offering can be either an 
underwritten offering, a rights offering, or a private 
placement. In a rights offering, a firm offers the 
securities on a pro rata basis to its own stockholders.
In an underwritten offering, the firm can either 
negotiate the offering terms with the underwriter(s) or 
structure the terms internally and solicit competitive 
bids. Similar to initial public offerings, the 
underwriting contract can be a firm commitment contract 
or a best effort contract.
A secondary equity or debt offering follows a 
series of steps similar to that of initial public 
offerings. The firm must identify and analyze the 
investment first and then determine whether to choose a 
underwritten offering or a rights offering. If an 
underwritten offering is chosen, the firm must first
determine the underwriter(s) and then negotiate with the 
underwriter in choosing between a firm commitment 
contract and a best effort contract. The selling period 
begins after the registration statement is approved by 
the SEC. The issue can not be sold at a price higher 
than the offering price during the selling period. After 
the selling is closed, the security can be publicly 
traded.
B. Hypothesis
Secondary security offerings have important 
valuation effects on the firm's existing common stocks. 
The direct result of a secondary security offering is the 
change in capital structure. Several theories show that 
a change in capital structure has important effects on 
the value of the firm (Miller and Modigliani (1958,
1963), Miller (1977), Ross (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980)). Also, several theories have been advanced which 
directly predict the valuation effects of security 
offerings (Myers and Majluf (1984), Miller and Rock
(1985)).
Empirical tests have examined the announcement 
effects of various types of security offerings. Earlier 
studies use samples of exchange offerings26, stock
26See, McConnell and Schlarbaum (1981).
repurchases27, and convertible bonds call and issuances28 
to examine the announcement and issuance effects on the 
valuation of common stocks. The general finding is that 
there is a positive relation between the direction of the 
leverage change and the sign of the revaluation of common 
stock. In other words, security offerings that increase 
leverage result in positive announcement effects, and 
security offerings that decrease leverage result in 
negative announcement effects. Recent studies 
concentrate on the announcement effects of equity, debt, 
and convertible bonds. The general finding is that 
equity and convertible bond offerings exhibit negative 
announcement effects (Masulis and Korwar (1986), Asquith 
and Mullins (1986), Dann and Mikkelson (1984)) and 
straight debt offerings show non-positive announcement 
effects (Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986), 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986)).
The tax effect is one of the major considerations 
in modern capital structure theory, which has important 
implications for the valuation effects of security 
offerings. According to Miller and Modigliani (1963), 
firm value is an increasing function of leverage ratio 
when corporate tax exists, and the optimal capital
27See, Masulis (1980), Dann (1981), and Vermaelen
(1981).
28See, Dann and Mikkelson (1984).
structure is 100% debt financing. The implications of 
this view are straightforward: debt financing has 
positive effects on firm value while equity financing has 
negative effects. This view is also shared by DeAngelo 
and Masulis (1980) although the importance of debt tax 
shields is partially replaced by tax-shields substitutes 
such as depreciation expenses and investment tax credits. 
Miller (1977) argues that the disadvantage of personal 
income tax exactly offsets the tax advantage of corporate 
borrowing when the firm pays the full statutory tax rate. 
Thus the presence of corporate tax only affects the 
aggregate debt-equity ratio and yields no optimal capital 
structure for an individual firm. The Miller theory 
predicts a neutral debt financing effect.
The considerations on the valuation effects of 
corporate tax are enhanced by incorporating other 
offsetting factors such as bankruptcy costs and agency 
costs. The capital structure is a result of the trade­
off between tax advantages and bankruptcy costs29 and the 
trade-off between tax advantages and agency costs of 
debt.30 Under this view, debt financing is regarded as 
the result of increased debt capacity, which provides 
more tax advantages to allow more bankruptcy costs and/or
29See, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973).
300ne type of agency cost of debt is the cost caused 
by the adverse managerial incentive effects of debt 
financing (see, Myers (1977)).
agency costs of debt. Equity offerings are interpreted 
just the opposite. Thus debt offerings are predicted to 
have positive valuation effects and equity offerings have 
negative valuation effects.
However, since REITs are not taxed at the corporate 
level, the tax incentives for debt financing do not 
exist. Based solely on tax considerations, debt 
financing is disadvantageous to REITs since they have to 
pay a competitive interest rate31 while obtaining no tax 
savings. In addition, the lack of tax saving rules out 
the trade-off between tax advantages and bankruptcy and 
agency costs. This line of reasoning suggests an optimal 
capital structure with 100 percent equity for REITs (Howe 
and Shilling (1988)) and predicts a negative debt 
announcement effect.
Given the captive-financing nature of REITs, 
agency-related capital structure theories may be more 
relevant to REIT valuation effects of security offerings. 
The classic agency literature postulates that there 
exists an equilibrium contractual form between the agents 
and the principals which gives optimal incentives to the 
agents to maximize the principal's wealth given 
incomplete monitoring. The captive-financing nature and 
the diffuse ownership structure may make monitoring from
31Which is equal to the rate paid by tax-free 
institutions grossed up by the corporate tax rate.
debt-holders particularly valuable for REITs.
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that a firm 
may prefer to venture frequently to the capital market, 
such as through issuing debt, since it provides a 
mechanism to monitor the management of the firm and hence 
reduces agency problems. Thus, ceteris paribus, debt 
offerings should have positive valuation effects for 
captive REITs.
Conversely, secondary equity offerings reduce the 
leverage ratio and hence relatively decrease the 
monitoring by creditors. This would result in a larger 
agency cost and decrease the firm value. Given this 
"monitoring argument," the following two hypotheses are 
formulated:
Hypothesis 2:
The stock price of captive REITs reacts more 
favorably to debt announcements than that of non-captive 
REITs.
Hypothesis 3:
The stock price of captive REITs reacts more 
unfavorably to equity announcements than that of non­
captive REITs.
IV: Conclusion
The pricing of security offerings, initial and 
secondary, reflects the market assessment (or the change
of the market assessment) of firm value. The pricing of 
IPOs is determined by uncertainties about the value of 
the underlying issue. The greater the uncertainty, the 
larger the underpricing. The captive-financing nature of 
REITs amplifies the agency problem for REITs. The higher 
the degree of captivity of the REIT, the greater the 
magnitude of potential agency problems. This in turn 
causes higher uncertainty in firm value. This 
uncertainty in firm value should be reflected in the 
pricing of IPOs. It is thus hypothesized that captive 
REITs have larger underpricing in IPOs than non-captive 
REITs.
Secondary security offerings can affect firm value 
via changes in agency costs. Given the agency problems 
caused by REITs' unique captive-financing nature, 
monitoring from creditors may be particularly valuable 
for REITs. Thus it is hypothesized that the stock price 
of captive REITs reacts more favorably to debt 
announcements and more unfavorably to equity 
announcements than that of non-captive REITs.
CHAPTER 4
REIT Initial Public Offerings 
I: Introduction
This chapter empirically investigates the pricing 
of REIT initial public offerings. The emphasis is placed 
on testing Hypothesis 1 that captive REITs have larger 
underpricing in IPOs than non-captive REITs. According 
to the literature, the pricing of IPOs is determined by 
uncertainties about the value of the underlying issue:
The greater the uncertainty, the greater the 
underpricing. The empirical setting follows the 
literature. Proxies for uncertainty are examined. In 
addition, variables for specific REIT characteristics are 
also examined, with emphasis on testing the effect of 
captive-financing. The degree of captivity has a 
significant impact on the pricing of REIT IPOs in the 
expected manner.
II: Measurement of Initial Returns
Following the IPO literature, there are two major 
steps for the study of REIT IPOs. The first step is to 
calculate the pricing for REIT IPOs and the second step 
is to investigate the possible determinants of the cross- 
sectional variations. In this section, the initial
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returns of REIT IPOs are examined.
Existing studies about initial public offerings 
focus on ordinary corporations. Several authors have 
provided convincing evidence that initial public 
offerings are, on average, underpriced. Ibbotson (1975) 
finds an average of 11.4 percent discount in the offering 
price for a sample of 120 firms offering new issues 
during 1960-1969. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) find a 16.8 
percent underpricing for a sample of 2,650 firms offering 
new issues during 1960-1970. Ritter (1984) finds 
underpricing of initial public offerings by non-financial 
corporations ranging from 18.8 percent to 48.4 percent. 
Chalk and Peavy (1987) find an average of 13.8 percent 
underpricing for a sample of 440 firms which covers the 
period 1974 to 1982.32
For REITs, IPOs are collected and their initial 
returns are calculated. An initial return is calculated 
as the difference between the first recorded closing 
price and the offering price, divided by the offering 
price. This definition follows Ritter (1984), Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), Slovin and Young (1988), Johnson and 
Miller (1988), and Muscarella (1988). In equation form:
32An anomalous finding is provided by Muscarella 
(1988). He finds no significant underpricing for a sample 
of fifty initial public offerings of master limited 
partnership units from 1983 to 1987.
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Ri~(pri”poi) / poi •
where R^ is the initial return for issue i, Pri is the 
first recorded closing price and P0  ̂is the offering 
price. R^ is positive if the offering is underpriced and 
is negative if the offering is overpriced.
As shown by Table 1, there were 294 REIT initial 
public offerings from 1961 to 1986. From the 294 IPOs, a 
sample of 55 IPOs are collected (Table 2).33 The 55 IPOs 
and their offering prices are collected from REIT Fact 
Book 1987. 1988, Moody's Banking and Financial 
Intermediaries. and Standard and Poor's Corporation 
Record. 1988. The first recorded closing prices are 
obtained from Standard and Poor/s stock Record of NYSE. 
AMEX and PTC.34 The majority of REITs were listed in the 
OTC market when going public and transferred to either 
NYSE or AMEX after a short period of time.
The initial returns of the sample and their 
distribution are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 
respectively. As shown by Table 5, the initial return 
ranges from 0.565 to -0.258 with a mean 0.0524 which is
33Among the 294 REIT IPOs, only 55 have sufficient 
data for the empirical model described in next section.
34The Standard and Poor's OTC Stock Records do not 
have daily closing price, thus the average of the 
recorded daily bid and ask prices are used for stocks 
initially listed in OTC. Stoll (1989) points out that the 
true price can be approximated by the mid-point of the 
bid and the ask price.
significantly different from zero at 95 percent 
confidence level (P value = 0.0188), indicating that REIT 
IPOs are underpriced by an average of 5.24 percent. This 
result is consistent with the traditional findings on the 
pricing of initial public offerings; however, the 
magnitude of underpricing is far smaller than that of the 
IPOs of ordinary corporations when compared to the 
findings of Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1984), and Chalk and 
Peavy (1987).
III. Empirical Model
A substantial body of research exists on the 
determinants of the pricing of IPOs. Previous studies 
(Logue (1973), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Johnson and 
Miller (1988), Tinic (1989)) suggest that the initial 
return is a function of uncertainty proxies such as 
offering size, underwriter prestige, offering types, etc. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, REITs possess the 
nature of financial intermediaries and operate in a 
different industry and in a different legal environment 
from ordinary corporations. The pricing of REIT IPOs may 
be determined by some unique factors in addition to the 
conventional factors identified by the IPO literature.
In particular, whether the agency cost created by the 
unique captive-financing nature of REITs constitutes an 
uncertainty in firm value and affects the pricing of REIT
IPOs or not is the major interest of this research.
A regression model is formulated to examine the 
variations in the initial returns:
R i = a Q+a ^LS^+a 2D U R i+a 3TYPEI j[+a4TYPE2 i+agO F F ^+agP T G ^+  
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The dependent variable, R^, is the initial return. 
The independent variables are as follows:
1. LS: This is the natural logarithm of the 
offering size. The offering size is adjusted for 
purchasing power (1967=100.0).35 In the sample, the 
largest and the smallest offering size are $232.99 
million and $1.90 million respectively after adjusting 
for purchasing power. The mean offering size is $29.27 
million after adjusting for purchasing power (Table 6). 
Table 8 shows the distribution of offering size.
2. DUR: This is the duration of the offering period 
which is the time length from the offering day to the 
first trading day. In the sample, the longest duration 
is 31.47 months. Some IPOs have zero duration; in other 
words, the offering day and the first trading day are the 
same day. The mean duration is 5.27 months (Table 6). 
Table 9 shows the distribution by duration.
3. TYPE1: TYPE1 is a dummy variable which has value
35This follows Beatty and Ritter (1986).
1 for equity REITs, 0 for hybrid and mortgage REITs.
REITs are generally categorized into three types: equity 
REITs, mortgage REITs, and hybrid REITs. Using the 
definition of the National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (NAREIT), equity REITs hold at least 75 
percent of their assets in the ownership of real estate 
equity interests. Mortgage REITs hold at least 75 percent 
of their assets in mortgages. Hybrid REITs hold both 
equities and mortgages. In the sample, there are 18 
equity REITs, 5 hybrid REITs, and 32 mortgage REITs 
(Table 10).
4. TYPE2: TYPE2 is a dummy variable which has value 
1 for hybrid REITs and 0 for equity and mortgage REITs. 
The purpose of this variable is the same as that of 
TYPE1.
5. PTG: PTG is a dummy variable which has value 1 
if the underwriter of the offering is deemed as 
"prestigious" and has value 0 otherwise.
According to Hayes (1971), the prestige and 
originating experience of investment bankers can be 
classified in descending order into special bracket 
firms, major bracket firms, submajors, and others. 
Following Tinic (1988), and Miller and Johnson (1988), 
this study categorizes the first two groups, special 
bracket and major bracket firms into "prestigious" firms 
and the last two groups, submajors and others into
"fringe" firms. In the sample, 40 REIT IPOs were handled 
by "prestigious" investment bankers, and 15 IPOs were 
underwritten by "fringe" investment bankers (Table 11).
6. OFT: OFT has value 1 if the method of best 
effort is used for the IPO and has value 0 if the method 
of firm commitment is used. In the sample, 50 REIT IPOs 
chose firm commitment and 5 IPOs used best effort (Table 
12).
7. INFIN: INFIN is a dummy variable which has value 
1 for infinite-life REITs and 0 for finite-life REITs. 
According to NAREIT, there has been a total of 39 finite- 
life REITs since 1975. Finite-life REITs are designed to 
exist for a definite length of time usually ranging from 
10 to 20 years. Forty three of the 55 REITs in the 
sample are infinite-life REITs (Table 13).
8. UNAFF: UNAFF is a dummy variable which has value 
1 if the REIT is classified as an unaffiliated REIT and 
has value 0 if the REIT is classified as an "affiliated" 
REIT by the NAREIT. Forty eight of the 55 REITs in the 
sample are unaffiliated REITs (Table 14).
9. OFF: OFF is the log of total dollar amount of 
REIT security offerings in the year the REIT went public. 
The dollar amounts are also adjusted for 1967 purchasing 
power. The REIT annual total dollar amount of offerings 
from 1961 to 1986 are shown in Table 1.
10. TIME: This variable has value 1 for REITs
organized in early 1970s and 0 for REITs organized in 
1980s. In the sample, 31 REITs are organized in 1970s 
and 24 REITs are organized in 1980s (Table 15).
The data of the above variables are obtained from 
REIT Fact Book 1987 and 1988 f Moody/s Banking and 
Financial Intermediaries. and Standard and Poor's 
Corporation Record. 1988.
In addition to the above variables, proxies for 
REIT captivity are searched to test Hypothesis 1 that 
captive REITs have a greater underpricing in IPOs than 
non-captive REITs. Being aware of the possible captive 
arrangement for REITs, the SEC requires that the REIT's 
organizational relationship (with its sponsor, advisor 
and affiliates), and investment objectives be described 
in the prospectuses of IPOs.36 Thus if it is found from 
the prospectus that a REIT is to be captive such that it 
will have an advisor (which is usually a subsidiary of 
the sponsor) and/or will have a business relationship 
with its affiliates such as the sponsor and the advisor, 
then possible conflicts of interest exist, and so does 
the agency cost associated with this agency problem. 
However, since a prospectus only provides a general
36See, Derenthal "Real estate investment trusts: 
formation and initial public offerings," September 1985, 
Sorg Printing Company Incorporated. Also, see 
prospectuses of REIT initial public offerings.
description about the possible conflicts of interest,37 
the magnitude of the agency cost constitutes an 
uncertainty. On the other hand, if it is found from the 
prospectus that the REIT does not seem to be captive in 
the sense that the REIT is going to be self-managed and 
will have business relationships with organizations which 
are not affiliated with the REIT, the uncertainty about 
this type of agency cost is less. Thus the uncertainty 
about this type of agency cost for an IPO investor seems 
to depend on the information about the captivity of the 
REIT provided by the prospectus, and the disclosure of 
this information is required by the SEC.
Since not all of the IPO prospectuses for the REITs 
in the sample are obtainable, an alternative approach is 
used. The 10-K reports of sample REITs are scanned. If a 
REIT is found to have advisory agreement and/or business 
relationship with its sponsor, advisor, and/or affiliates 
"ex post", the REIT is deemed as captive. It is assumed 
that the IPO prospectus of the REIT has disclosed this 
information, and consequently the "ex ante" uncertainty 
about the possible conflicts of interest (and hence, the 
agency cost) exists. On the other hand, if no 
information about advisory agreement and business 
relationship with affiliates can be found for a REIT from 
the 10-K, the REIT is assumed to be non-captive, and the
37See, prospectuses of REIT initial public offerings.
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prospectus of the REIT would have contained no 
information about the firm's captivity either. In this 
case, there is little uncertainty about the possible 
conflicts of interest for the REIT at the stage of the 
initial public offering.
Using the above line of reasoning, three captivity 
variables, CAP, BU, and AD are used. CAP is a dummy 
variable which has value 1 if a REIT 1) has business 
relationships with its affiliates and 2) employs an 
advisor, and has value 0 otherwise. BU is a dummy 
variable which has value 1 if a REIT has business 
relationships with its affiliates and has value 0 
otherwise. AD is a dummy variable which has value 1 if a 
REIT employs an advisor, and has value 0 otherwise.
These three variables separate REIT into captive and non­
captive groups, and ex post captive REITs may have ex 
ante greater uncertainty about the agency cost caused by 
the conflicts of interest than non-captive REITs. Given 
the SEC's stringent requirements on the revelation of 
firm information, the possibility of misclassification by 
the above method is small.
The regression model uses BU as the captivity 
variables. For the results using CAP and AD as the 
captivity variable, see Appendix A, sections X, XI, and 
XII.
IV: Analysis
A. Difference in Means
In Table 7, the 55 REITs are classified by BU. In 
Table 8 to Table 15, the REITs are first classified by 
each of the independent variables respectively and are 
then broken down to captive and non-captive REITs by BU. 
The average initial return of each group is calculated 
and its significance is tested (See, Table 7 to Table 
15). In addition, tests of difference-in-means are 
performed and the results are also reported in Table 7 to 
Table 15.
As shown by Table 7, captive REITs classified by BU 
have an average initial return 8.05 percent which is 
significantly different from zero at 95 percent level, 
and non-captive REITs have an average initial return 2.54 
percent which is not significantly different from 0. The 
mean initial returns of the captive and non-captive REITs 
classified by BU are not significantly different from 
each other (Table 7).38
In Table 8, the 55 REITs are categorized into 4 
groups by offering size. Among the four groups, only the 
second group (20.0<=SIZE<40.0) has an average initial
38The mean tests for the initial returns of captive 
and non-captive REITs classified by the other two 
captivity proxies, CAP and AD are shown in Appendix A, 
section IX.
return significantly different from zero. In other word, 
the underpricing of REIT IPOs mainly comes from IPOs 
with a size ranging from 20 to 40 million. When REITs 
are broken down to captive and non-captive, only the 
captive REITs in the third group has an average initial 
return significantly different from zero. The 
difference-in-means tests show that the initial returns 
of captive and non-captive REITs are not different from 
each other for all of the four groups.
In Table 9, the REITs are categorized by the 
duration of the offering. The majority of REIT IPOs have 
a duration less than or equal to 6 months and greater 
than one day. This is also the group which has a 
significant difference in means between the average 
initial returns of captive and non-captive REITs.
When REITs are grouped into equity, hybrid, and
mortgage REITs, on’y the mortgage group has an initial
return significantly different from zero (Table 10), 
indicating that the underpricing of REIT IPOs mainly 
comes from the IPOs of mortgage REITs. The captive REITs 
in the mortgage group also has an average initial return 
significantly different form zero. However, none of the 
three difference-in-means tests detects any significant 
difference in means between captive and non-captive REITs 
for all of the three groups.
When REITs are categorized into two groups based on
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underwriter prestige, only the "prestigious" group has an 
initial return significantly different from zero.
However, there is no difference in means between the 
initial returns of captive and non-captive REITs for both 
groups (Table 11).
When REITs are categorized into two groups based on 
offering types, firm commitment and best effort, only the 
firm commitment group has an average initial return which 
is significantly different from zero. This indicates 
that the underpricing of REIT IPOs mainly comes from the 
IPOs using a firm commitment contract. The average 
initial return of captive REITs in the firm commitment 
group is significantly different from zero. However, 
there is no difference in means between the initial 
returns of captive and non-captive REITs for both groups 
(Table 12).
In Table 13, REITs are separated into two groups: 
infinite-life and finite-life. The finite-life group has 
an average initial return significantly different from 
zero. The captive REITs in both groups have an initial 
return significantly different from zero. In the 
infinite-life group, the initial return of captive REITs 
is significantly different from that of non-captive REITs 
at 95% level.
As shown by Table 14, when REITs are separated into 
two groups: unaffiliated and affiliated, only the
unaffiliated group has an initial return significantly 
different from zero. The captive REITs in the 
unaffiliated group has an initial return significantly 
different from zero. However, there is no difference in 
means between the initial returns of captive and non­
captive REITs in the unaffiliated group. The difference- 
in-means test is not performed for the affiliated group 
due to small sample size.
In Table 15, REITs are separated into two groups: 
the REITs organized in 1970s and the REITs organized in 
1980s. The 1970s group has an initial return which is 
positive and significantly different from zero at 99% 
level. However, the 1980s group has an initial return 
which is negative and significantly different from zero 
at 95% level, indicating that REITs organized in 1980s 
have overpriced IPOs. The captive REITs in both groups 
have an initial return significantly different from zero. 
There is a difference in means between the initial 
returns of captive and non-captive REITs for the 1970s 
group.
B. Regressions
1. The Unrestricted Sample
In estimating the regression model, the problem of 
heteroscedasticity would be present if ordinary least 
squares is used since every firm potentially has a
different return variance. Thus weighted least squares 
is employed in the regressions. Ritter (1984) shows that 
initial returns are positively correlated with the risk 
of the underlying issue, when the risk of the underlying 
issue is measured by either the issuing firm's past sales 
or by the standard deviation (or equivalently, the 
variance) of the first 20 trading day returns of the 
issue. Following Ritter's finding, Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) use log(l,000+sales) as the weighing factor.
Since almost all REITs were new firms when going public, 
data on past sales are not available. Thus another 
weighing factor, the variance of the first 20 trading day 
returns is used in this study. To transform the data, 
both the dependent and independent variables are 
multiplied by 1/(TVAR*X) where TVAR is the variance of 
the first 20 trading day returns and X=10,000 is a scale 
factor. Since X is constant across all observations, it 
will have no effect on the result.
The regression model is first estimated using the 
unrestricted sample (e.g., the 55-IPO sample). The 
results are presented in Table 16.
In existing empirical tests of IPO pricing, 
offering size is used as a surrogate for the uncertainty 
of the firm (Logue (1973), Ritter (1984), Miller and 
Johnson (1988)). A negative relationship between LS and 
the initial return is predicted. As shown by Table 16,
56
LS has significant and negative impact on initial 
returns. Thus IPOs with larger offering size have less 
underpricing than IPOs with smaller size. This result is 
consistent with the prediction.
Booth and Smith (1986) propose a "certification 
hypothesis" which is based on the information asymmetry 
between existing shareholders and prospective subscribers 
to new issues. The existing shareholders have superior 
knowledge about the nature of the firm compared to 
outside investors and may take opportunistic actions at 
the expense of outside investors. Underwriters can be 
employed to certify that the issue price is consistent 
with inside information and to reduce the magnitude of 
underpricing. This is termed "third party 
certification." Based on their analysis, Booth and Smith 
conclude that firm value can be increased if the firm 
makes a bonding investment to certify the offering price 
and this certification can be strengthened if an 
underwriter is employed who has invested in its 
reputation.
The implication of the Booth-Smith model is that 
IPOs handled by "fringe" investment bankers would tend to 
be relatively more underpriced. The reason is that 
"fringe" underwriters have less reputation on 
underwriting than prestigious ones and hence are forced 
to underprice more to protect their business. This
implication is supported by Tinic (1988) who finds that 
IPOs underwritten by "fringe" investment bankers are 
underpriced significantly more than those underwritten by 
prestigious investment bankers. Johnson and Miller (1988) 
find a negative relationship between the level of banker 
prestige and the degree of IPO underpricing.
As shown by Table 16, however, the underwriter 
prestige (PTG) is positively related to initial returns, 
indicating that REIT IPOs handled by prestigious 
investment bankers are priced lower than those handled by 
"fringe" underwriters. This result is contradictory to 
the implication of certification hypothesis and to 
Tinic/s finding (1988).
DUR (the duration of an offering) proxies the 
uncertainty of market demand on an offering to test 
Baron's (1982) theory. Baron contends that the 
investment banker is better informed about the market 
demand for the firm's security than the issuer, and the 
optimal offering price is a decreasing function of the 
uncertainty about the market demand for the issue while 
the value of employing the underwriter is an increasing 
function of the uncertainty. A greater uncertainty about 
market demand creates difficulties for underwriters to 
price the IPO correctly and results in a longer duration 
on average. Thus the longer the ex post duration, the 
greater the ex ante uncertainty about the market demand,
and hence the larger the underpricing.39
The insignificance of DUR (Table 16) does not 
support Baron's theory (1982) that the degree of 
underpricing is an increasing function of the uncertainty 
about the market demand of the issue, if DUR is an 
appropriate proxy for the uncertainty of market demand. 
However, this result is consistent with Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989). They test Baron's theory by using a 
sample of IPOs of investment bankers. Since the issuers 
are themselves underwriters in this case, the information 
asymmetry between the issuers and the underwriters does 
not exist. Contrary to the Baron theory, Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens find significant underpricing in IPOs of that 
sample and the magnitude of underpricing is comparable to 
that of other IPOs.
Equity REITs and mortgage REITs are different in 
some fundamentals such as cash flow pattern. Existing 
empirical studies show that in the past two decades, 
equity REITs were different from mortgage REITs in terms 
of return and riskiness.40 Thus it is desirable to see 
whether REIT types affect the pricing of initial public 
offerings. The insignificance of TYPE1 and TYPE2 
indicates that REIT types, equity or mortgage, do not
39The duration has a negative relationship with the 
first trading day volume. See Appendix A, section II.
40See, for example, Kuhle and Walther (1986).
affect IPO pricing (Table 16).
There are two major types of underwriting 
contracts: best effort and firm commitment. Ritter
(1985) argues that best effort contracts should result in 
smaller underpricing because the adverse selection 
problem for uninformed investors is reduced under best 
effort contracts.41 The reason is that under best effort 
contracts, if the subscription of the issue does not 
reach the pre-specified level, the offer would be 
cancelled, and the uninformed investors avoid the losses 
to informed investors in the case that the issue is 
actually overpriced. On the other hand, it is found that 
best effort contracts are usually used when the 
underlying issue has greater ex ante uncertainty (Ritter
(1985)).42 This finding predicts that best effort 
offerings have greater underpricing than firm commitment 
offerings if the above mentioned uncertainty theories are 
correct. Ritter (1985),43 Chalk and Peavy (1985),44 
Slovin and Young (1988), and Beatty (1989) find that best 
effort offerings have higher underpricing than firm 






As shown by Table 16, OFT is not significant, which 
is contrary to existing findings.
Infinite-life and finite-life REITs are different 
in the length of life. Most of the finite-life REITs are 
also single-purpose REITs, namely, their investment 
policies are fixed and are stated in the IPO prospectus. 
This may help to attenuate the information asymmetry 
problem between informed and uninformed investors about 
the firm's prospects. Thus it is predicted that 
infinite-life REITs have larger initial returns than 
finite-life REITs# However, the insignificance of INFIN 
does not support the prediction that IPOs of infinite- 
life REITs have greater uncertainty than those of finite- 
life REITs (Table 16).
The "affiliated" REITs have a common sponsor and 
usually have the same advisor.45 For the IPO of an 
"affiliated" REIT, investors may be able to assess the 
uncertainty of the issue based on the performance of 
other REITs in the family. Thus it is predicted that 
unaffiliated REITs have larger underpricing than 
"affiliated" REITs
The insignificance of UNAFF does not support the 
prediction that IPOs of unaffiliated REITs have greater
45For example, the Travelers Corporation sponsored 
two "affiliated" REITs: Travelers Real Estate Investment 
Trust and Travelers Realty income Investors. They have 
the same advisor, Keystone Realty Advisers, Inc.
uncertainty than those of affiliated REITs.
The purpose in using OFF is to identify the 
possible influence from the market supply on the pricing 
of REIT IPOs. According to Ritter (1984), initial return 
has a positive relationship with concurrent total dollar 
amount of security offerings. If this result holds for 
REIT IPOs, OFF should have a positive relationship with 
initial returns. The insignificance of OFF is 
inconsistent with Ritter's findings.
As shown by Table 1 and Table 2, REIT IPOs seem to 
cluster in two time periods, the early 1970s and the 
first half of 1980s. Between these two periods is the 
great recession for the real estate market. Many REITs 
went bankrupt during this recession. The survivors made 
critical adjustments to their operations as well as to 
their financial structure46. REITs organized after this 
recession also operated under a different legal and 
economic environment. Given these structural changes for 
REITs, it is desirable to examine whether there is a 
difference in the pricing of IPOs between REITs organized 
in the two time periods. The insignificance of TIME 
indicates that the possible structural changes for the 
REIT industry caused by the recession in the late 1970s
46See, REIT Fact Book 1988, Chapter II.
did not result in a difference in REIT IPO pricing.47
The captivity proxy BU is positive and significant, 
indicating that captive REITs have larger underpricing 
than non-captive REITs. This result supports Hypothesis 
1.
2. The Restricted Sample
For further analysis, REIT IPOs with duration 
greater than 12 months are excluded from the total 
sample. The reason is that the duration of a REIT IPO 
can be at least partly determined ex ante-some REIT 
shares can not be traded after the initial public 
offering for a pre-determined period. The pricing of 
these IPOs might be fundamentally different from other 
IPOs. An IPO with a long duration is more likely to have 
a pre-determined "non-trading" period, thus they are 
excluded from the sample. The selection of 12 months is 
arbitrary.
In addition, REIT IPOs which choose a best effort 
contract are also excluded from the total sample. The 
reason is that under best effort contracts, if the 
subscription of the issue does not reach the pre­
specified level, the offering would be cancelled, and the 
proceeds must be returned to the subscribers. This
47The regression results using the other two 
captivity proxies CAP and AD are shown in Appendix A, 
section X.
condition may result in survivorship bias in the analysis 
of REIT IPO pricing if best effort offerings are. included 
in the sample. The exclusion of IPOs with duration 
greater than 12 months and of IPOs which used a best 
effort contract results in a restricted sample which 
contains 46 IPOs.48
For the model, the independent variables used are 
the same except TIME. TIME is not used to avoid the 
possible multicollinearity with OFF. The model is again 
weighted by 1/(TVAR*X).
Table 18 shows the regression results. SIZE is 
negative and significant at 90 percent level, which is 
consistent with our prediction. DUR is negative and 
significant at 90 percent level, which is contrary to our 
prediction that the longer the duration, the larger the 
underpricing. TYPE1 and TYPE2 are not significant, 
indicating that REIT types do not differentiate IPO 
pricing. PTG is positive and significant at 95 percent 
level, which is again contrary to our prediction. OFF is 
not significant, which is not consistent with the Ritter 
finding. INFIM is not significant, which does not
48For the 46-IPO sample,the average initial return 
is 0.0428 with a t-statistic 1.988 and a p-value 0.0509. 
The summary statistics and the correlation coefficients 
of the independent variables without weighing are 
presented in Appendix A, section V and VI respectively. 
The summary statistics and correlation coefficients of 
the independent variables weighted by 1/(TVAR*X) are 
shown in Appendix A, section VII and VIII respectively.
support the prediction that infinite-life REITs have 
greater underpricing than finite-life REITs. UNAFF is 
not significant. The captivity variables BU is 
significant at 95 percent level, which supports 
Hypothesis l that captive REITs have larger underpricing 
than non-captive REITs.49
The model used in this regression analysis is 
further adjusted. PTG is omitted to avoid the possible 
multicollinearity with SIZE. INFIN and UNAFF are also 
omitted to avoid the possible multicollinearity with 
SIZE, TYPE1, and OFF. OFF is not used to avoid the 
possible multicollinearity with TIME.50 The sample for 
this model is again the restricted sample (46 IPOs).
The regression results are shown in Table 19. SIZE 
is negative and significant at 95 percent level, which is 
consistent with our prediction. DUR is negative and 
significant at 99 percent level. This result is 
inconsistent with our prediction. TYPE1 is positive and 
significant at 95 percent level, indicating the equity 
REITs have larger underpricing than other types of REITs. 
TYPE2 is not significant. TIME is not significant. The
49The regression results using other two captivity 
proxies are shown in Appendix A, section XI.
50See the correlation coefficient matrix in Appendix 
A, section VIII.
captivity variable BU is not significant.51
In summary, although some independent variables 
vary in their significance in the regression models, SIZE 
shows consistently significant relationships with the 
initial return. The negative relationship between SIZE 
and the initial return is consistent with the prediction 
that larger size has smaller uncertainty and hence 
smaller underpricing than smaller size. The significant 
and positive relationship between BU and the initial 
return in two of the above three regression analysis 
supports Hypothesis 1.
V: Conclusion
The IPO literature postulates that uncertainties 
characterize the pricing of IPOs. IPOs are underpriced 
due to the information asymmetry between the informed and 
uninformed market participants about the value of the 
underlying issue. REITs IPOs are also underpriced; 
however, the magnitude of the underpricing is far lower 
than that of the IPOs of ordinary corporations documented 
in the literature. The regression analyses of REIT IPOs 
focus on the influence of the uncertainty of REIT value 
caused by the agency cost incurred from the captive- 
financing nature. The regression results support
51The regression results using other two captivity 
proxies are shown in Appendix XII.
Hypothesis 1 that captive REITs have larger underpricing 
than non-captive REITs. In addition, the uncertainty 
proxy, firm size, has a negative relation with initial 
return which is consistent with the findings in the 
literature. However, IPOs underwritten by "prestigious11 
investment bankers are more underpriced. This result is 
contradictory to the finding of Tinic (1988).
CHAPTER 5
REIT Debt Offerings 
I: Introduction
This chapter empirically examines the wealth effect 
of REITs debt announcements, again focusing on the 
influence of REIT captive nature. Various capital 
structure theories provide many implications for the 
valuation effects of debt offerings. Given the unique 
captive-financing nature, the agency cost related capital 
structure theory may be more relevant to REITs. In the 
cross-sectional analyses, a proxy for REIT captivity is 
used to test Hypothesis 2: the stock price of captive 
REITs reacts more favorably to debt announcements than 
non-captive REITs. The empirical results do not support 
the hypothesis.
II: Measurement of Abnormal Returns
There are two steps of this investigation: the 
event study and the cross-sectional analysis of 
announcement effects. In this section, event studies on 
debt offerings are performed.
A. Data and Methodology
The recent findings on the valuation effects of
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debt offerings are that convertible bond offerings 
exhibit negative announcement effects (Masulis and Korwar
(1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Dann and Mikkelson 
(1984)), and straight debt offerings show non-positive 
announcement effects (Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo
(1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986)). These event 
studies use the market model.
The REIT debt announcement effects are examined 
using the mean-adjusted model. Howe and Shilling (1988) 
point out that for the event study of real estate firms, 
the mean-adjusted model is more appropriate than the 
market model. The methodology follows Howe and Shilling 
(1988). The mean return for each firm is calculated 
using days -80 to day -41 returns (day 0 is the 
announcement day). The abnormal return on day i is 
obtained by subtracting the mean return from the day i 
return.
Three announcements are examined: debt52 
announcement, line of credit announcement, and 
debenture53 announcement. The announcement data is 
collected from the Wall Street Journal Index. The daily 
stock returns are obtained from the CRSP tape. The
52Including senior debentures, subordinated 
debentures, senior notes, subordinated notes, floating 
rate notes, term loans and bank lines of credit.
53Including senior debentures, subordinated 
debentures, senior notes, subordinated notes, floating 
rate notes, and term loans.
sample size for debt announcement is 36. This sample is 
further split into two samples: the line of credit sample 
and the debenture sample. The size of the line of credit 
sample is 17 and the size of the debenture sample is 19. 
For every security announcement, no other security 
announcement is made by the firm during a period of four 
months prior and one month after the announcement. In 
addition, if an event occurred on a day during the 
announcement period (day -10 to day +10), the abnormal 
return of that day is excluded from calculating the 
average abnormal return of that day.
B. Results
1. The Debt Sample
Different from the Howe and Shilling findings 
(1988), REIT debt offerings in this study shows no 
announcement effect on day -1 and day 0. As shown by 
Table 20, the average abnormal return for day -1 (AAR_^) 
is -0.0067 with a t-statistic -1.1436.54 The average 
abnormal return for day 0 (AAR0) is zero with a t- 
statistic -0.0047. However, this result is consistent 
with existing findings on debt announcements by ordinary 
corporations (Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986),
54The t-statistic is egual to AAR^/SD, where AAR^ is 
the average abnormal return on day i and SD is the 
standard deviation of daily average returns for the 
period day -40 to day -11.
Mikkelson and Partch (1984)). The cumulative abnormal 
returns and their t-statistics55 are also shown in Table 
20.
2. The Line of Credit Sample
Similar announcement effects hold for line of 
credit announcements. As Table 21 shows, the average 
abnormal return for day -1 (AAR_^) is -0.0039 with a t- 
statistic of -0.3167. The average abnormal return for 
day 0 (AARq ) is -0.0028 with a t-statistic -0.2303. The 
cumulative abnormal returns and their t-statistics are 
shown in Table 25.
3. The Debenture Sample
As Table 22 shows, the average abnormal return for 
day -1 (AAR_2,) is -0.0094 with a t-statistic -3.0492, 
which is significant at 99% level. The average abnormal 
return for day 0 (AAR0) is -0.0025 with a t-statistic 
-0.7987, which is not significant. Since announcement 
effects can be reflected on day -l,56 this result 
indicates a negative announcement effect for debenture 
announcements. The cumulative abnormal returns and their
55The t-statistic for cumulative abnormal returns is 
equal to CAAR^^j/(SD*N°•5), where SD is the standard 
deviation of average daily returns for the period day -40 
to day -11 and N is the number of days for the cumulation.
56See, Asquith and Mullins (1986).
t-statistics are shown in Table 22.
Ill: Empirical Model
The major purpose of this empirical investigation 
of REIT debt offerings is to search for the determinants 
of announcement effects. Emphasis is placed on the 
possible monitoring effects from debtholders to test 
Hypothesis 2 that the stock price of captive REITs reacts 
more favorably to debt announcements than that of non­
captive REITs. A regression model is formulated. Based 
on the existing literature, several independent variables 
are examined, with emphasis placed on the captivity 
variable BU.
Ordinary least squares procedures are used for the 
following regression model:
Yi=a0+a1TVi+a2PFi+a3LVGi+a4CHGi+a5TYPEi+a6LINEi+a7BUi+ei
Two dependent variables are used separately: the 
cumulative average abnormal return from day -1 to day 0 
(CAAR_;l/0)» and the cumulative average abnormal return 
from day -1 to day +1 (CAAR_1/+1). For the sample of the 
regression analysis, the observations in which events 
occurred during day -1 to day +1 are excluded from the 
36-announcement sample, resulting in a sample size of 31. 
The independent variables are described in the following.
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1. TV:
This variable is the total risk of the issuing 
firm's common stock measured by 10,000 times the variance 
of the stock's returns over the sixty trading days prior 
to the announcement period. The mean of this variable is 
17.9102 (Table 23).
2. PF:
This variable is the stock price appreciation 
measured by the cumulative stock returns for the ninety 
trading days period prior to the announcement period.
The mean of this variable is 0.0848 (Table 23).
3. LVG:
This variable is the leverage ratio before the 
announcement. Following Eckbo (1986), LVG is the sum of 
the issuing firm's long and short-term debt (excluding 
convertible debt) before the offering, divided by the 
market value of common stock prior to the offering. The 
debt data is taken from the Moody's Banking and Financial 
Intermediaries, and the market value of common stock is 
taken from the CRSP master files. The mean of this 
variable is 7.5427 (Table 23).
4. CHG:
This variable is the change in leverage ratio due 
to the offering. This variable is the leverage ratio 
after the offering minus the leverage ratio before the
offering (LVG). The leverage ratio after the offering is 
the sum of the issuing firm's debt (excluding convertible 
debt) before the offering and the dollar amount of the 
offering, divided by the market value of common stock 
prior to the offering. The mean of this variable is 
4.5848 (Table 23).
5. TYPE:
TYPE is a dummy variable which has value 1 for 
mortgage REITs and 0 for hybrid REITs.57 Twenty of the 
31 announcements come from mortgage REITs.
6. LINE:
LINE is a dummy variable which has value 1 for line 
of credit announcements and 0 for debenture 
announcements. Fifteen of the 31 debt announcements are 
line of credit announcements.
7. BU:
This variable has been described in Chapter 4. It 
is used to separate REITs into captive and non-captive 
groups. Based on this variable, 13 of the 31 debt 
announcements come from captive REITs.
IV: Regression Results
A. The Debt Sample
The inclusion of the variable TV in the model
57There are no equity REITs in this sample.
follows Masulis and Korwar (1986). They use this 
variable to proxy the market's uncertainty about the 
value of the firm's current assets. The higher the 
uncertainty, the greater the Myers and Majluf information 
asymmetry problem,58 and consequently the larger the 
magnitude of the market's negative reaction to the firm's 
debt offerings. Thus it is predicted that TV has a 
negative relationship with debt announcement effects.
When CAAR_i 0 is used as the dependent variable, TV is 
negative and significant at 99% level (Table 24), which 
is consistent with the prediction. When CAAR_^,+i is 
used as the dependent variable, TV is not significant 
(Table 25).
Masulis and Korwar (1986) show that the variable PF 
is used by the market to predict equity announcements. 
They point out that large stock price appreciation lowers 
firm leverage ratio, and a firm would find that it is 
disadvantageous to further decrease its leverage ratio by 
selling additional common stock. Thus an equity offering 
is less anticipated for a firm with larger stock price 
appreciation, and since the equity offering is less 
anticipated, the announcement of an equity offering by 
such a firm is predicted to have a larger negative market
58Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that given the 
superior information about the firm's prospects, 
management and insiders may act opportunistically on 
behalf of existing shareholders and issue securities 
whenever they are over-prices.
reaction. On the contrary, the debt offering for such a 
firm is predicted to have a larger positive market 
reaction since the debt offering mitigates the problem of 
reduced leverage ratio caused by stock price 
appreciation.
When CAAR_i,0 used as the dependent variable, PF 
is not significant (Table 24). When CAAR_i/+1 is used as 
the dependent variable, PF is also not significant (Table 
25). These results do not support the prediction.
LVG is used by Eckbo (1986) as one of the proxies59 
for information asymmetry between management and 
investors to test the Myers and Majluf prediction on debt 
offerings. According to Eckbo, the higher the leverage 
ratio prior to the offering, the higher the risk of the 
debt offering, and consequently, the greater the 
information asymmetry problem. This line of reasoning 
predicts a negative relationship between LVG and 
announcement effects for debt offerings. When CAAR_i/q 
is used as the dependent variable, LVG is not significant 
(Table 24). When CAAR„2 +̂1 is used as the dependent 
variable, LVG is negative and significant at 95% level 
(Table 25), which is supportive of the prediction.
CHG is the change in leverage ratio due to the 
offering. Masulis and Korwar (1986) find that offerings 
which increase leverage result in a more positive
59Another proxy used by Eckbo is the bond rating.
announcement effect. However, if this announcement 
effect comes from the increase in tax savings, then this 
result may not hold for REIT security offerings since 
REITs are exempt from corporate taxes. According to Ross 
(1977), the change in leverage ratio signals the change 
in firm quality. If the increase in firm quality is 
proportional to the magnitude of the increase in leverage 
ratio, then CHG should have a positive relationship with 
debt announcement effects. When CAAR_1#0 usec* as the 
dependent variable, CHG is significant at 90% level 
(Table 24). When CAAR_1#+1 is used as the dependent 
variable, CHG is positive and significant at 99% level 
(Table 25), which supports the Ross argument.
The reason to include TYPE in the model is given in 
Chapter IV. As Tables 24 and 25 show, TYPE is not 
significant, indicating that REIT types (mortgage and 
hybrid) do not affect debt announcement effects.
Howe and Shilling (1988) found positive debt 
announcement effects, and the positive effects mainly 
come from short term debt offerings. They indicate that 
the results lend support to the Flannery (1986) 
signalling effects. The short term debt offerings are 
mainly lines of credit. Thus it is predicted that LINE 
has a positive relationship with the dependent variable. 
As shown by Tables 24 and 25, LINE is not significant, 
which does not support the prediction.
The captivity variable BU is not significant as 
shown by Tables 24 and 25, which does not support 
hypothesis 2 that the stock price cf captive REITs reacts 
more favorably to debt announcements than non-captive 
REITs.60
B. The Line of Credit Sample
The sample for the regression analysis of line of 
credit announcements contains 15 observations. The 
regression results using the two dependent variables are 
shown in Tables 28 and 29 respectively.
When CAAR_1/0 is used as the dependent variable, TV
is negative and significant at 99% level (Table 28),
which is consistent with the prediction. When CAAR_i/+i 
is used as the dependent variable, TV is not significant 
(Table 29).
When CAAR_ifQ is used as the dependent variable, PF 
is not significant (Table 28). When CAAR_i/+1 is used as 
the dependent variable, PF is also not significant (Table 
29). These results do not support the prediction that PF 
has a positive relationship with announcement effects.
When CAAR_i,0 *-s use<* as the dependent variable,
LVG is not significant (Table 28). When CAAR_i/+i is
used as the dependent variable, LVG is negative and
60The regression results using the other captivity 
variable AD are shown in Appendix B, sections XI and XII.
significant at 95% level (Table 29), which supports the 
prediction.
When CAAR_i/0 is used as the dependent variable,
CHG is not significant (Table 28). When CAAR_1/+i is 
used as the dependent variable, CHG is positive and 
significant at 95% level (Table 29), which supports the 
prediction.
As Tables 28 and 29 show, TYPE is never 
significant, indicating that REIT types (mortgage and 
hybrid) do not affect line of credit announcement 
effects.
The captivity variable BU is not significant as 
shown by Tables 28 and 29, which does not support 
Hypothesis 2 that captive REITs have more positive debt 
announcement effects than non-captive REITs.61
C. The Debenture Sample
The sample for the regression analysis of debenture 
announcements contains 16 observations. The regression 
results using the two dependent variables are shown in 
Tables 32 and 33 respectively. As shown by the tables, 
none of the independent variables is significant.62
61The regression results using AD as the captivity 
variable are shown in Appendix B, sections XIII and XIV.
62The regression results using AD as the captivity 
variable are shown in Appendix B, sections XV and XVI.
In addition, difference-in-raeans tests are performed for 
the three samples. The results are shown in Appendix B,
V: Conclusion
Given the unique captive-financing nature of REITs, 
this study focuses on the agency cost implications on the 
valuation effects of REIT debt offerings. Contrary to 
the Howe and Shilling (1988) findings, debt offerings in 
the sample do not exhibit announcement effects. When the 
debt sample is split into the line of credit sample and 
the debenture sample, no announcement effects are found 
for either sample.
On the regression analysis, the independent 
variables exhibit varying relationships with the 
dependent variables. However, the captivity variable BU 
is insignificant in all the three samples, which does not 
support Hypothesis 2 that captive REITs have more 
positive debt announcement effects than non-captive 
REITs.
sections I to X.
Chapter 6
REIT Secondary Equity Offerings 
I: Introduction
This chapter empirically examines the wealth effect 
of REIT secondary equity offerings, again focusing on the 
influence of REIT captive nature. Various capital 
structure theories provide many implications for the 
valuation effects of secondary equity offerings. Given 
the unique captive-financing nature, the agency cost 
related capital structure theory may be more relevant to 
REITs. In the regression analysis, a proxy for REIT 
captivity is used to test Hypothesis 3: the stock price 
of captive REITs reacts more unfavorably to equity 
announcements than non-captive REITs. The empirical 
results do not support the hypothesis.
II: Measurement of Abnormal Returns
A. The Sample
There are two steps for this investigation: the 
event study and the cross-sectional analysis of 
announcement effects. In this section the event study is 
performed.
Secondary equity offerings are found to have 
negative announcement effects (Masulis and Korwar (1986),
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Asquith and Mullins (1986), Dann and Mikkelson (1984)). 
These event studies use the market model. The event 
study for REIT equity offerings uses the same methodology 
as debt offerings in the previous chapter. Nineteen 
equity announcements are collected from the Wall Street 
Journa1 Index. The daily stock returns are obtained from 
the CRSP tapes. For every security announcement, no 
other security announcements are made by the firm during 
a period of four months prior and one month after the 
announcement. If an event occurred on a day during the 
announcement period (day -10 to day +10), the abnormal 
return on that day is excluded from calculating the 
average abnormal return of that day.
B. Results
Consistent with the Howe and Shilling (1988) 
finding, equity offerings exhibit significantly negative 
announcement effects. As shown by Table 35, the average 
abnormal return for day -1 (AAR_1) is -0.0129 with a t- 
statistic of -3.2116, which is significant at the 99% 
level. The average abnormal return for day 0 (AARq ) is 
-0.0042 with a t-statistic of -1.0360, which is not 
significant. Given that day -1 can possibly capture the 
announcement effects, this result is consistent with 
existing literature (for example, Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986)). The cumulative
average abnormal returns and their t-statistics are also 
shown in Table 35.
Ill: Empirical Model
The major purpose of this empirical investigation 
on REIT secondary equity offerings is to search for the 
possible determinants of announcement effects. Emphasis 
is placed on the possible monitoring effects from 
debtholders to test Hypothesis 3. A regression model is 
estimated to see what factors influence the equity 
announcement day stock revaluation. Based on the 
existing literature, several explanatory variables are 
selected, with emphasis placed on the captivity variable 
BU.




The two variables, CAAR_1>0 and CAAR_1/+1, are used 
separately as dependent variable Y. For the sample of 
the regression analysis, the observations in which events 
occurred during day -1 to day +1 are excluded from the 
19-announcement sample, resulting in a sample size of 
18. The independent variables are described in the
following.
1. TV:
This variable has been described in section III, 
Chapter 5. The mean of this variable is 2.9362 (Table 
36).
2. PF:
This variable has been described in section III, 
Chapter 5. The mean of this variable is 0.1896 (Table 
36).
3. RS:
This variable is the percentage increase in common 
stock outstanding due to the offering. It is the total 
number of shares of the equity offering divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding prior to the offering. 
The mean of this variable is 0.3441 (Table 36).
4. CHG:
This variable is the change in leverage ratio due 
to the offering. This variable is the leverage ratio 
after the offering minus the leverage ratio before the 
offering (LVG). The leverage ratio after offering is the 
sum of the issuing firm's debt (excluding convertible 
debts) before the offering divided by the sum of the 
market value of common stock prior to the offering and 
the dollar amount of the equity offering. This variable 
has a mean -.1589 (Table 36).
5. SIZE:
This variable is the offering amount divided by the 
market value of common stock prior to the offering. 
Offering size is obtained from the Wall Street Journal 
Index and REIT Fact Books. The mean of this variable is 
0.2759 (Table 36).
6. TYPE1:
TYPE1 is a dummy variable which has value 1 for 
equity REITs and 0 for mortgage and hybrid REITs. In the 
sample, nine announcements come from equity REITs, four 
announcements come from hybrid REITs, and five 
announcements come from mortgage REITs.
7. TYPE2:
TYPE2 is a dummy variable which has value 1 for 
hybrid REITs and 0 for equity and mortgage REITs.
8. BU:
This variable has been described in Chapter 4, 
which separates REITs into captive and non-captive 
groups. Based on this variable, eight of the 18 
announcements come from captive REITs.
IV: Regression Results
The regression results are shown in Table 37 and 
Table 38. TV is the total risk of the issuing firm's 
common stock. The inclusion of this variable follows 
Masulis and Korwar (1986). They use this variable to
proxy the market's uncertainty about the value of the 
firm's current assets. The higher the uncertainty, the 
greater the Myers and Majluf information asymmetry 
problem, and consequently the larger the magnitude of the 
market's negative reaction to the firm's debt or equity 
offerings. Thus it is predicted that TV has a negative 
relationship with equity announcement effects. As Tables 
37 and 38 show, TV is not significant when CAAR_1/0 or 
CAAR_if+1 is used as the dependent variable, which does 
not support the prediction.
PF is the stock performance prior to the 
announcement. Masulis and Korwar (1986) show that this 
variable is used by the market to predict equity 
announcements. They point out that large stock price 
appreciation lowers leverage ratio, and a firm would find 
that it is disadvantageous to further decrease its 
leverage ratio by selling additional common stock. Thus 
equity offering is less anticipated for a firm with 
larger stock price appreciation, and since equity 
offering is less anticipated, the announcement of equity 
offering by such a firm is predicted to have a larger 
negative market reaction. However, the insignificance of 
PF does not support this prediction (Tables 37 and 38).
RS is the percentage increase in common stock 
outstanding due to the offering. It is used by Masulis 
and Korwar (1986) to test Jensen and Meckling (1976)
agency theory and the Leland and Pyle (1977) signalling 
theory. According to both theories, equity announcements 
result in a larger negative stock reaction for firms with 
larger percentage rise in shares outstanding, if 
management's share holding is not increased 
proportionately. Thus assuming management's share 
holding remain unchanged, the larger the RS, the larger 
the negative equity announcement effects. As shown by 
Tables 37 and 38, RS is not significant, which does not 
support the prediction.
CHG is the change in leverage ratio due to the 
offering. Masulis and Korwar (1986) find that offerings 
which increase leverage result in a more positive 
announcement effect. However, if this announcement 
effect comes from the increase in tax savings, then this 
result may not hold for REIT security offerings since 
REITs are exempt from corporate taxes. In particular, 
the change in leverage ratio caused by equity offerings 
is relevant to the Galai and Masulis (1976) wealth- 
transfer hypothesis. According to Galai and Masulis, 
debt becomes less risky after an unanticipated reduction 
in financial leverage, consequently, bondholders gain at 
the expense of shareholders. If the gain is an 
increasing function of the reduction in financial 
leverage, CHG has a positive relationship with equity
announcement effects63. However, the insignificance of 
CHG does not support this prediction (Tables 37 and 38).
Eckbo (1986) specifies SIZE as a proxy for the 
amount of unanticipated new financing to test Miller and 
Rock (1985) implied-cash-flow hypothesis. Miller and 
Rock contend that outside investors realize the 
Myers/Majluf type of information asymmetry problem, and 
interpret firm debt/equity offerings as results of the 
firm's receiving lower than expected cash flows.64 Based 
on this hypothesis, SIZE would have a negative 
relationship with equity announcement effects. The 
insignificance of SIZE does not support the prediction 
(Tables 37 and 38).
As shown by Tables 37 and 38, TYPE1 and TYPE2 are 
not significant, indicating that REIT types do not affect 
equity announcement effects.
BU separates REITs into captive and non-captive 
groups. Based on the theory developed in the previous 
chapters, it is hypothesized that the stock price of 
captive REITs reacts more unfavorably to equity 
announcements than non-captive REITs. As shown by Tables 
37 and 38, BU is not significant, which does not support
63For equity offerings, CHG is always negative.
64Miller and Rock also argue that equity issues are 
equivalent to negative dividends. Since an increase in 
dividend conveys positive information concerning the 




Given the unique captive-financing nature of REITs, 
this study focuses on the agency cost implications of the 
valuation effects of REIT secondary equity offerings.
Consistent with the literature, equity offerings 
exhibit negative announcement effects. On the equity 
cross-sectional analysis, several explanatory variables 
suggested by the literature are examined. However, REIT 
equity announcement effects are not explained by those 
variables. In particular, the captivity variable BU 
exhibits no explanatory power, which does not support 
Hypothesis 3 that the stock price of captive REITs reacts 
more unfavorably to equity announcements than non-captive 
REITs.
65The regression results using CAP and AD as the 
captivity variable are shown in Appendix C, sections XII 
and XIII. In addition, difference-in-means tests are 




There exists a substantial body of literature 
dealing with captive-financing arrangements. This 
literature has discussed three motivations for captive- 
financing arrangements: improving operational efficiency, 
enhancing debt capacity and transferring wealth between 
equity-holders and bond-holders. The general conclusion 
of this literature is that the parent companies' 
shareholders gain by forming a captive-financing firm.
One type of captive-financing arrangement that has 
received little attention is the real estate investment 
trust (REIT). REITs are often created as captive- 
financing affiliates by their sponsors. The formation of 
captive REITs creates conflict of interest problems 
between the sponsors and the shareholders of the REITs. 
These problems create agency costs for REITs. The 
diffuse ownership structure of REITs makes monitoring of 
management difficult. Thus monitoring by creditors may be 
particularly valuable for REITs. The higher the degree 
of captivity of the REIT, the higher the probability for 
the agency problems to occur. This, in turn, causes a 
higher uncertainty in firm value due to the higher 
uncertainty in agency costs associated with these agency 
problems.
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This dissertation explores how the agency costs 
caused by the captive-financing nature of REITs affects 
firm value through empirical investigations of the 
pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary 
debt and equity offerings of REITs.
The theoretical literature on IPOs argues that 
underpricing is caused by uncertainties about the value 
of the underlying issue; and the greater the uncertainty, 
the larger the underpricing. REITs IPOs are also 
underpriced, but the magnitude of the underpricing is far 
lower than that of the IPOs of ordinary corporations 
documented in the literature. Captive REITs have a 
higher uncertainty in firm value than non-captive REITs 
due to the possible greater magnitude of agency problems. 
The higher uncertainty in firm value will yield a larger 
underpricing in the IPO. Using this line of reasoning, 
it is hypothesized that captive REITs have greater 
underpricing in IPOs than non-captive REITs. The 
regression results support this hypothesis.
Given the captive-financing nature of REITs, agency 
related capital structure theories may be more relevant 
to REIT valuation effects of secondary debt and equity 
offerings. The captive-financing nature and the diffuse 
ownership structure may make monitoring from debt-holders 
particularly valuable for REITs. Sinr a debt offerings 
increase leverage ratios and hence ' lcrease the degree of
monitoring from debt-holders, it is hypothesized that the 
stock price of captive REITs reacts more favorably to 
debt announcements than that of non-captive REITs. The 
regression results do not support this hypothesis.
Conversely, secondary equity offerings reduce 
leverage ratios and hence decrease the degree of 
monitoring by debt-holders. This results in a larger 
agency cost and decreases firm value. Thus it is 
hypothesized that the stock price of captive REITs reacts 
more unfavorably to equity announcements than that of 
non-captive REITs. The regression results do not support 
this hypothesis.
Table 1




Year No. Total NO. Total No. Total
1961 14 $ 71.9 14 $ 71.9 0 0.0
1962 16 105.9 12 81.8 4 24.1
1963 9 25.8 6 4.0 3 21.8
1964 19 36.2 11 1.4 8 34.8
1965 14 32.6 5 3.0 9 29.6
1966 3 5.8 1 0.0 2 5.8
1967 7 41.5 1 0.0 6 41.5
1968 14 122.4 4 67.6 10 54.8
1969 58 1,256.7 33 976.7 25 280.0
1970 72 1,687.4 41 1,358.4 31 329.0
1971 78 1,987.3 32 1,183.4 46 803.9
1972 67 1,223.3 29 563.2 38 660.11973 68 852.1 18 156.8 50 695.3
1974 17 23.7 5 1.5 12 22.21975 5 0.4 1 0.0 4 0.4
1976 8 19.7 0 0.0 8 19.7
1977 8 91.9 0 0.0 8 91.9
1978 12 91.5 3 8.4 9 83.11979 18 110.5 4 0.0 14 110.51980 20 264.0 4 30.0 16 234.01981 22 244.7 5 100.0 17 144.71982 12 453.6 3 315.0 9 138.61983 23 741.3 4 159.0 19 582.3
1984 34 2,729.9 9 378.8 25 251.1
1985 59 4,270.6 29 2,791.9 30 1,478.7
1986 63 4,668.9 20 1,204.4 43 3,464.5
Total 740 21,159.6 294 9,457.2 446 11,702.4
aData source: The REIT Fact Book 1988 published by 





Frequency of a sample of 55 REIT IPOs 
based on the offering year9
Cumulative Cumulative
Year Frequency Frequency Percent Percent
1969 5 5 9.1% 9.1%
70 11 16 20.0 29.1
71 15 31 27.3 56.4
82 1 32 1.8 58.2
84 4 36 7.3 65.5
85 18 54 32.7 98.2
86 1 55 1.8 100.0
aThe REIT IPO data is collected from REIT Fact 
B3£>&S/ Moodv * s Banking and Financial _Intermediaries > and 
Standard & Poor7sCorporation Records.
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Table 3




Larwin Mortgage Investors 69 -9.7
Midland Mortgage Investors 69 -14.0
Security Mortgage Investors 69 32.5
Sutro Mortgage Investors 69 -3.1
Washington REIT 69 -2.6
American Fletcher Mortgage Investors 70 9.6
Chase Manhatton Mortgage Investors 70 13.0
Connecticut General Mortgage & Realty 70 1.9
Guardian Mortgage Investors 70 15.0
Hubbard Real Estate Investors 70 -8.0
Lomas & Nettleton Mortgage Investors 70 37.5
MONY Mortgage Investors 70 0.0
National Mortgage Fund 70 -3.7
Unionamerica Mortgage & Equity 70 5.7
Wachovia Realty Investors 70 0.7
Wells Fargo Mortgage Investors 70 -19.8
C I Mortgage Group 71 56.5
Continental Ilinois Realty 71 37.7
Equitable Life Mortgage & Realty 71 20.0
Fidelco Growth Investors 71 10.2
First of Denver Mortgage Investors 71 25.3
General Growth Properties 71 31.1
Heitman Mortgage Investors 71 5.6
Hotel Investors 71 20.2
Investors Realty Trust 71 -9.7
Massmutual Mortgage & Realty Investors 71 20.5
PNB Mortgage & Realty Trust 71 32.8
Realty Refund Trust 71 -2.5
State Mutual Investors 71 17.8
Tri-South Mortgage Investors 71 37.8
Federal Realty Investor Trust 71 -4.5
Wedgestone Realty Investor Trust 82 10.4
Travelers REIT 84 -1.8
VMS Short Terra Income Trust 84 -9.1
REIT of California 84 4.4
Strategic Mortgage Investors 84 0.0
Beverly Investor Properties 85 0.0
Copley Properties 85 -4.6
EQK Realty Investors I 85 -6.9
Grubb & Ellis Realty Income Trust 85 -2.3
Health Care Property Investors 85 5.2
Lincoln N C realty Fund 85 0.0
Table 3 (Continued)
Mellon Participation Mortgage 85 0.1
Nooney Realty Trust 85 0.0
Rainier Realty Investors 85 -5.0
Realty South Investors 85 -4.7
Resources Pension Share III 85 -9.8
Rockfeller Center Property 85 -4.6
Sierra R E Equity Trust 83 85 0.4Trammell Crow R E 85 0.0
Travelers Realty Income Trust 85 -4.7
Turner Equity Investors 85 -9.1
Weingarten Realty 85 -2.3Lomas Mortgage Corporation 85 0.0
CRI Insured Mortgage Investors II 86 -4.6
aInitial returns Rj/s are calculated as: Ri=(Pfi" 
poi)/poi' where Pr  ̂is the first recorded closing price and PQi is the offering price. Issue i is underpriced if 
is positive.
Table 4
Frequency of a sample of 55 REIT IPOs based 
on the level of initial return
Initial Cumulative Cumulative
Return3 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Ri<-.2 1 1.8 1 1.8-.2<=R^<-.1 2 3.3 3 5.1
-. l<=Rjt< .0 20 36.4 23 41.8.0<=Rj< .1 16 29.1 39 70.9•l<=Rj< .2 5 9.1 44 80.0.2<=R^< .3 4 7.3 48 87.3.3<=R^< .4 6 10.9 54 98.2.4<=Ri 1 1.8 55 100.0
aInitial returns R-j/s are calculated as: Ri=(Ppi” 
poi)/poi' where Pr  ̂is the first recorded closing price 
and PQi is the offering price. Issue i is underpriced if 
Ri is positive.
Table 5
Statistics of initial returns for 55 REIT IPOs
Number of observations 55Mean 0.0524Highest 0.565Lowest -0.258
Standard deviation 0.1606T: Mean = 0.0 2.421Prob > abs(T) 0.0188
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Table 6
Summary statistics of the variables of the 
55-IPO sample without weighing
Standard
Variables N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
R 55 .0524 .1606 -.2580 .5650LS 55 2.9781 .9066 .6419 5.4501DUR 55 5.2707 7.2821 .0000 31.4700
TYPE1 55 .3273 .4735 .0000 1.0000TYPE 2 55 .0909 .2901 .0000 1.0000
OFF 55 7.2048 .3274 5.2138 7.5010
PTG 55 .7273 .4495 .0000 1.0000
OFT 55 .0909 .2901 .0000 1.0000TIME 55 .5636 .5005 .0000 1.0000
INFIN 55 .7818 .4168 .0000 1.0000UNAFF 55 .8727 .3364 .0000 1.0000
CAP 55 .4182 .4978 .0000 1.0000TVAR 55 .0004424 .0005743 .0000014 .0032
R: the initial return.
LS: The log of the offering size expressed in terms of 
1967 purchasing power.
DUR: the duration of the offering which is expressed in 
months.
TYPE1: a dummy variable which has value 1 for equity 
REITs and 0 for hybrid and mortgage REITs.
TYPE2: a dummy variable which has value 1 for hybrid 
REITs and 0 for equity and mortgage REITs.
OFF: the log of the concurrent yearly total dollar amount 
of REIT security offerings which is expressed in terms of 
1967 purchasing power.
PTG: a dummy variable which has value 1 if the 
underwriter of the issue is deemed prestigious and has 
value 0 otherwise.
OFT: a dummy variable which has value 1 for best effort 
offerings and 0 for firm commitment offerings.
TIME: a dummy variable which has value 1 for REITs 
organized in the 1970s and 0 for REITs organized in the 
1980s.
INFIN: a dummy variable which has value 1 for infinite- 
life REITs and has value 0 for finite-life REITs.
UNAFF: a dummy variable which has value 1 for 
unaffiliated REITs and has value 0 for affiliated REITs.
Table 6 (Continued)
BU: a dummy variable which separates REITs into captive 
and non-captive. It has value 1 if the REIT has business 
relationships with its sponsor, or advisor, or their 
affiliates, and has value 0 otherwise.
TVAR: the variance of the first 20 trading day returns.
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Table 7
Average initial returns classified by 
REIT captivity3 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs
REIT       Difference in
Captivity N Initial Return N Initial Return N Initial Return Means Test
BU 55 0.0524b 28 0.0254 27 0.0805b -0.0551
(2.4209) (0.90762) (2.4462) (-1.2789)
A REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor, 
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 95% level.
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Table 8
Average initial returns classified by offering
size ($ millions) and REIT captivity9
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs

























2 -0.1385 2 0.0770 -0.2155
A REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor, 
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 90X level.
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Table 9
Average initial returns classified by
duration (months) and REIT captivity9
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs
-----------      Difference in



























0 - 3 0.1730
(0.8806)
-
18.0<DUR<=24.0 1 0.1020 1 0.1020 0 - -
24.0<DUR<=30.0 2 0.0540 2 0.0540 0 - -
30.0<DUR 1 0.3770 0 _ 1 0.3770 .
aA REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor, 
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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Table 10
Average initial returns classified by
REIT type and captivity0
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs
 ........ -..................................................... Difference in
REIT Type N Initial Return N Initial Return N Initial Return Means Test
















Mortgage REIT 32 0.0797b 19 0.0426 13 0.1339b -0.0913
(2.4688) (1.2417) (2.2215) (-1.4120)
aA REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor, 
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 95% level.
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Table 11
prestige and REIT captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs
Underwriter .................. - -....... -...........................   Difference in
Prestige N Initial Return N Initial Return N Initial Return Means Test
Prestigious 40 0.0490b 18 0.0217 22 0.0713 0.0496
(1.9335) (0.5667) (2.1076) (0.9741)
Non- 15 0.0617 10 0.0321 5 0.1210 -0.0889
Prestigious (1.4294) (0.8027) (1.1499) (-0.9682)
aA REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor,
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 90% level.
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Table 12
Average initial returns classified by 
offering type and REIT captivity8 







 ................  Difference in


















aA REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor,
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 95% level.
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Table 13
Average initial returns classified by 
REIT life and captivity3 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs
................................................................... Difference in
REIT Life N Initial Return N Initial Return N Initial Return Means Test
Infinite- 43 0.0762 24 0.0345 19 0.1288b -0.0943c
Life (2.8708) (1.0712) (3.0623) (-1.8143)
Finite- 12 -0.0326b 4 -0.0290 8 -0.0344b 0.0054
Life (-3.5150) (-1.2195) (-3.8433) (0.2615)
aA REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship uith its sponsor, advisor, 
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 95% level.
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Table 14
Average initial returns classified by 
REIT affiliation and captivity8 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs
REIT        Difference in
Affiliation N Initial Return N Initial Return N Initial Return Means Test
Unaffiliated 48 0.0575b 26 0.0310 22 0.0888b -0.0578
(2.4656) (1.0407) (2.4430) (-1.2432)
Affiliated 7 0.0180 2 -0.047 5 0.0440 0.0910
(0.2928) - (0.5228)
aA REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor,
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 95% level.
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Table 15
Average initial returns classified by 
offering time and REIT captivity0 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs
....................... *.................................   Difference in
Offering Time N Initial Return N Initial Return N Initial Return Means Test
1970s 31 0.1088b 19 0.0429 12 0.2132b -0.1703°
(3.1411) (1.0714) (4.1168) (-2.6154)
1980s 24 -0.0204° 9 -0.0117 15 -0.0257° 0.0140
(-2.1273) (-0.6381) (-2.3211) (0.6983)
°A REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor, 
and/or affiliates.
Significant at 99% level.
°significant at 95% level.
Table 16
Weighted least squares regression results with the
initial return as the dependent variable,

















aThe weighing factor is 1/(TVAR*X), where TVAR is 
the variance of the first 20 trading day returns and X is 
equal to 10,000. The sample size is 55. For the 
definition of the independent variables, see Table 6. 
^Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 95% level.
^Significant at 90% level.
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Table 17
Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for the variables of 
the 55-IPO sample / prob>|R| under Hq : Rho=0a
LS DUR TYPE1 TYPE2 OFF PTG OFT TIME INFIN UNAFF CAP BU AD
R .060 .307 -.236 .039 .217 -.035 -.156 .402 .282 .082 .170 .173 .003
.661 .022 .082 .775 .110 .795 .254 .002 .036 .548 .212 .206 .980
LS -.171 -.095 -.001 .285 .373 -.134 .078 -.045 .059 .296 .286 .161
.210 .478 .989 .034 .005 .326 .568 .743 .664 .028 .033 .239
DUR -.126 -.158 -.193 -.364 .259 .141 .061 .057 -.010 -.079 .055
.359 .248 .156 .006 .055 .303 .654 .6 77 .937 .566 .686
TYPE1 -.220 .042 .079 -.085 -.323 -.100 .033 -.041 .167 -.371
.105 .756 .566 .533 .015 .464 .806 .764 .221 .005
TYPE2 .013 .193 -.100 .023 -.139 -.069 .116 .069 .130
.923 .156 .467 .866 .310 .616 .396 .616 .342
OFF .188 -.456 .428 .053 .118 .045 .066 -.044
.167 .001 .001 .697 .387 .738 .627 .746
PTG -.232 -.127 .071 .133 .105 .193 -.021











































aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 6.
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Table 18
Weighted least squares regression results with the
initial return as the dependent variable














aThe weighing factor is 1/(TVAR*X), where TVAR is 
the variance of the first 20 trading day returns and X is 
equal to 10,000. The sample size is 46. For the 
definition of the independent variables, see Table 6. 
^Significant at 99% level. 
cSignificant at 95% level.
“Significant at 90% level.
1 1 2
Table 19
Weighted least squares regression results with the
initial return as the dependent variable,











aThe weighing factor is 1/(TVAR*X), where TVAR is 
the variance of the first 20 trading day returns, and X 
is equal to 10,000. The sample size is 46. For the 
definition of the independent variables, see Table 6. 
^Significant at 99% level. 
cSignificant at 95% level.
^Significant at 90% level.
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Table 20
Average and cumulative abnormal returns to REITs around 








-10 -.012d -2.0587 -.0121d -2.0587-9 .0094 1.5876 -.0028 -.3331-8 -.0004 -0.0649 -.0032 -.3094-7 -.0018 .3004 -.0049 -.4182-6 .0026 .4428 -.0023 -.1760-5 -.0020 -.3345 -.0043 -.2972-4 .0057 .9610 .0014 .0881-3 .0057 .9691 .0070 .4250-2 .0081 1.3756 .0152 .8592-1 -.0067 -1.1436 .0085 .4535
0 -.0000 -.0047 .0085 .4310+1 .0122d 2.0722 .0206 1.0109+2 .0008 .1336 .0214 1.0083+3 .0079 1.3379 .0293 1.3292
+4 -. 0120d -2.0304 .0174 .7598+5 -.0007 -.1247 .0166 .7045+6 .0028 .4797 .0138 .5671+7 -.0017 -.2859 .0121 .4838+8 -.0084 -1.4216 .0037 .1447+9 -.0097 -1.6461 -.0060 -.2270+10 .0093 1.5700 .0033 .1211
aThe sample size is 36. Debt includes senior 
debentures, subordinated debentures, senior notes, 
subordinated notes, floating rate notes, term loans and 
bank lines of credit.
bThe t-statistic is equal to AARi/SD, where AAR^ is 
the average abnormal return on day i and SD is the 
standard deviation of daily average returns for the 
period day -40 to day -11. SD=0.00590.
cThe t-statistic for cumulative abnormal returns is 
equal to CAARi/-j/(SD*N0 ,5) , where SD is the same as in 
footnote b and n is the number of days for cumulation. 
^Significant at 95% level.
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Table 21
Average and cumulative abnormal returns to REITs around 







-10 -.0192 -1.5642 -.0192 -1.5642-9 .0244e 1.9865 .0052 .2986-8 .0028 .2303 .0080 .3768-7 -.0026 -.2159 .0054 .2183-6 .0123 1.0028 .0176 .6438-5 -.0041 -.3311 .0136 .4525-4 .0282d 2.3015 .0418 1.2888-3 .0129 1.0508 .0547 1.5771-2 .0106 .8637 . 0653e 1.7748
-1 -.0039 -.3167 .0614 1.58360 -.0028 -.2303 .0586 1.4404+1 .0204 1.6641 .0790e 1.8595+2 .0001 .0096 .0791e 1.7892+3 .0143 1.1660 .0934e 2.0357+4 -.0096 -.7821 .0838e 1.7648+5 .0079 .6478 . 0917e 1.8707+6 -.0072 -.5854 .0846 1.6728+7 .0078 .6373 . 0924e 1.7759
+8 -.0202 -.6467 .0722 1.3508
+9 -.0089 -.7233 .0633 1.1548+10 .0156 1.2695 .0789 1.4040
aThe sample size is 17.
^The t-statistic is equal to AARi/SD, where AARi is
the average abnormal return on day i and SD is the 
standard deviation of daily average returns for the 
period day -40 to day -11. SD=0.01226.
cThe t-statistic for cumulative abnormal returns is
equal to CAARi j/(SD*N°•5), where SD is the same as in 
footnote b and'N is the number of days for cumulation. 
Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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Table 22
Average and cumulative abnormal returns to REITs around 
the announcement of debenture offerings3
Average Cumulative
Abnormal Abnormal
Event Day Return t-statistic53 Return t-Statisticc
-10 -.0058f -1.8862 -.0058f -1.8862-9 -.0041 -1.3084 -.0099e -2.2589-8 -.0036 -1.1585 -.0135e -2.5133-7 -.0009 -.3049 -.0144e -2.3290-6 -.0061f -1.9542 -.0205d -2.9571-5 -.0001 -.0340 -.0206e -2.7133
-4 -.0109d -3.5345 -.0315e -3.8479-3 -.0011 -.3408 —.0326e -3.7199
-2 .0059 1.9032 —.0267e -2.8728-1 -,0094d -3.0492 -.0361d -3.68960 -.0025 -.7987 -.0337d -3.2771+1 .0050 1.6143 —.0287e -2.6716+2 .0015 .4842 -.0272e -2.4324+3 .0022 .6967 -.0250e -2.1578
+4 -.0141d -4.5540 -.0391d -3.2604+5 -.0094d -3.0387 -.0485d -3.9166+6 -.0013 .4125 -.0473d -3.6996+7 -.0097d -3.1267 -.0569d -4.3323+8 .0021 .6816 -.0548d -4.0604+9 -.0104d -3.3476 -.0652d -4.7061+10 .0039 1.2745 -.0612d -4.3146
aThe sample size is 19. Debentures include senior 
debentures, subordinated debentures, senior notes, 
subordinated notes, floating rate notes, and term loans.
kThe t-statistic is equal to AARjySD, where AARjl is 
the average abnormal return on day i and SD is the 
standard deviation of daily average returns for the 
period day -40 to day -11. SD=0.00310.
cThe t-statistic for cumulative abnormal returns is 
equal to CAAR^ ^/(SD*N°•5), where SD is the same as in 
footnote b and « is the number of days for cumulation. 
Significant at 99% level.
S ig n i f ic a n t  a t  95% level, 
fSignifican t a t  90% level.
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Table 23




CAAR_2. o 31 -.0112 .0587 -.1560 .1670CAAR-i +i 31 .0018 .0608 -.1040 .2430TV 31 17.9102 33.9133 .8990 131.4880PF 31 .0848 .2451 -.3070 .9600LVG 31 7.5427 12.9670 .2950 65.3090CHG 31 4.5848 9.2696 .1370 37.7450TYPE 31 .6452 .4864 .0000 1.0000LINE 31 .4839 .5080 .0000 1.0000BU 31 .4222 .4995 .0000 1.0000AD 31 .8888 .3178 .0000 1.0000
CAAR_i the cumulative average abnormal return for day 
-1 to day 0.
CAAR_ 2  +1: the cumulative average abnormal return for day 
-1 to day +1.
TV: the total risk of the issuing firm's common stock 
measured by 10,000 times the variance of the stock's 
returns over the sixty trading days prior to the 
announcement period (day +10 to day -10).
PF: the stock price appreciation measured by the 
cumulative stock returns for the ninety trading days 
period prior to the announcement period (day +10 to day -10).
LVG: the sum of the issuing firm's long and short-term 
debt before the offerings divided by the market value of 
common stock prior to the offering. Convertible bonds are 
not included.
CHG: the change in leverage ratio due to the offering, 
which is equal to the offering amount divided by the 
market value of common stock prior to the offering.
TYPE: a dummy variable which has value l for mortgage 
REITs and 0 for hybrid REITs. There is no equity REITs 
in this sample.
LINE: a dummy variable which has value 1 for lines of 
credit and 0 for debentures.
BU: a dummy variable which separates REITs into captive 
and non-captive groups. It has value 1 if the REIT has 
business relationship with the sponsor, advisor, or their 
affiliates and has value 0 otherwise.
AD: a dummy variable which separates REITs into captive 
and non-captive groups. It has value 1 if the REIT 
employs an advisory agreement and has value 0 otherwise.
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Table 24
Ordinary least squares regression results for debt
announcements with CAAR_1>q as the dependent variable,
using BU as the captivity variable3
Parameter t 
Estimates Statistics







aCAAR_1 o : the cumulative average abnormal return for day -1 to'day 0. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 23.
“Significant at 99% level.
^Significant at 95% level.
“Significant at 90% level.
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Table 25
Ordinary least squares regression results for debt
announcements with CAAR.^ +1 as the dependent variable,
using BU as theCaptivity variable3
Parameter t 
Estimates Statistics




aCAAR_1 +1 : the cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day +1. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 23.
“Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 95% level.
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Table 26
Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables of the 
debt sample / Prob > jR| under HQ: Rho=0 / N=31a
CAAR . +1 TV 
.765 ' -.446 
.000 .012















CAAR.i +i -.271 -.495 .021 .224 -.159 .046 -.023 .167
.140 .005 .913 .227 .394 .805 .904 .368
TV .302 .584 .534 .254 .434 -.327 -.049
.098 .001 .002 .168 .015 .072 .791
PF -.039 -.217 .037 -.208 .165 -.074
.832 .240 .843 .261 .372 .688
LVG .942 .208 .426 -.273 -.282





















aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 23.
1 2 0
Table 27
Summary statistics of the variables of 
the line of credit sample3
StandardVariable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
ca a r_1 o 15 -.0158 .0717 -.1560 .1670CAAR-i +1 15 .0046 .0782 -.1040 .2430TV 15 32.8553 44.5708 2.2950 131.4880PF 15 .0330 .3027 -.3070 .9600LVG 15 13.1580 17.1025 .2950 65.3090CHG 15 8.8328 12.1021 .2040 37.7450TYPE 15 .6667 .4880 .0000 1.0000BU 15 .3333 .4880 .0000 1.0000AD 15 .8000 .4140 .0000 1.0000
aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 23.
1 2 1
Table 28
Ordinary least squares regression results for line of
credit announcements with CAAR_^ q as the dependent
variable, using BU as the captivity variablea
Parameter t 
Estimates Statistics
Intercept .0087 .216TV -.0018b -3.869






aCAAR_i o : tbe cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day 0. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 23.
Significant at 99% level.
S ig n i f ic a n t  a t  90% level.
1 2 2
Table 29
Ordinary least squares regression results for line of
credit announcements with CAAR_^ +1 as the dependent
variable, using BU as the cap'tivity variable3
Parameter t 
Estimate Statistic








aCAAR_! +1: the cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day +1. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 23.
“Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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Table 30
Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables of the 
line of credit sample / Prob > jRj under HQ: Rho=0 / N=15a
CAAR . 
.770 +1 ™
PF LVG CHG TYPE BU AD
CAAR.,, Q ' -.576 -.364 .070 .185 .069 -.100 -.109
.001 .024 .182 .802 .507 .805 .722 .698
CAAR.1 +i -.397 -.650 -.019 .253 .059 -.050 .233
.142 .008 .944 .361 .832 .858 .402
TV .524 .489 .420 .415 -.409 .042
.044 .063 .118 .123 .129 .880
PF .063 .164 .169 -.170 -.133





















aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 23.
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Table 31
Summary statistics of the variables of 
the debenture sample3
StandardVariable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
CAAR_1 0 16 -.0069 .0452 -.1120 .0750CAAR_X +1 16 -.0009 .0409 -.0630 .0680TV 16 3.8992 3.6543 .8990 12.7500PF 16 .1334 .1717 -.0910 .5490LVG 16 2.2784 1.4824 .4640 5.8720CHG 16 .6023 .4362 .1370 1.5500TYPE 16 .6250 .5000 .0000 1.0000BU 15 .5000 .5164 .0000 1.0000AD 15 .9375 .2500 .0000 1.0000
aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 23.
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Table 32
Ordinary least squares regression results for debenture
announcements with CAAR_210 as the dependent variable,












aCAAR_1 q : the cumulative average abnormal return
for day -1 to'day 0. For the definition of the
independent variables, see Table 23.
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Table 33
Ordinary least squares regression results for debenture
announcements with CAAR_i +i as the dependent variable,












aCAAR_1 +1: the cumulative average abnormal return
for day -1 to'day +1. For the definition of the
independent variables, see Table 23.
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Table 34
Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables of the 
debenture sample / Prob > jR{ under Hq: Rho=0 / N=16a
CAAR . 
.785
TV PF LVG CHG TYPE BU AO
caar_m .459 .187 .379 .190 -.403 .112 -.017
.000 .073 .486 .147 .479 .121 .677 .949
CAAR_i .613 -.013 .429 .255 -.569 .042 .026
.011 .959 .097 .339 .021 .875 .922
TV -.127 .445 .607 -.364 -.174 .190
.637 .083 .012 .165 .518 .479
PF .016 .018 -.143 .628 -.094





















aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 23.
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Table 35
Average and cumulative abnormal returns to REITs around 








-10 -.0032 -.8029 -.0032 -.8029-9 -.0027 -.6688 -.0059 -1.0407-8 -.0011 .2769 -.0070 -1.0096-7 .0018 .4430 -.0052 -.6528-6 -.0001 -.0277 -.0054 -.5963-5 .0014 .3599 -.0039 -.3974-4 .0017 .4251 -.0022 -.2073-3 -.0033 -.8167 -.0055 -.4826-2 .0020 .4984 -.0035 -.2889-1 -.0129d -3.2116 -.0164 -1.28970 -.0042 -1.0360 -.0205 -1.5420+1 -.0074f -1.8360 -.0279f -2.0064+2 -.0013 -.3322 -.0292f -2.0198+3 -.0007 -.1661 -.0299f -1.9908+4 -.0101e -2.5194 -.0400e -2.5738+5 .0050 1.2459 -.0350e -2.1806+6 -.0036 -.8998 -.0386e -2.3337+7 .0003 .0656 -.0384e -2.2525+8 -. 0072f -1.8065 -.0456e -2.6069+9 -.0037 -.9136 -.0493e -2.7451+10 .0028 .6922 -.0465e -2.5280
aThe sample size is 19. Equity includes common 
stock/shares of beneficial interest and common 
stock/share of beneficial interest with warrant(s).
°The t-statistic is equal to AAR^/SD, where AAR^ is
the average abnormal return on day i and SD is the 
standard deviation of daily average returns for the 
period day -40 to day -11. SD=0.00383.
cThe t-statistic for cumulative abnormal returns is 
equal to CAARj^/(SD*N°*5), where SD is the same as in 
footnote b and n is the number of days for cumulation. 
Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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Table 36
Summary statistics of the variables for the equity sample
Standard
Variable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
CAAR_!,o 18 -.0188 .0228 -.0680 .0180CAAR_1/+1 18 -.0261 .0268 -.0960 .0240TV 18 2.9362 2.3020 .7880 9.0390PF 18 .1896 .1315 -.0300 .4220RS 18 .3441 .1931 .1456 .9309CHG 18 -.1589 .2302 -.8900 -.0060SIZE 18 .2759 .1432 .0130 .5190TYPE1 18 .5000 .5145 .0000 1.0000TYPE2 18 .2778 .4609 .0000 1.0000CAP 18 .1111 .3234 .0000 1.0000
BU 18 .4444 .5113 .0000 1.0000AD 18 .2778 .4609 .0000 1.0000
CAAR_i o: the cumulative average abnormal return for day 
-1 to day 0.
CAAR_i +i: the cumulative average abnormal return for day 
-1 to day +1.
TV: the total risk of the issuing firm's common stock 
measured by 10,000 times the variance of the stock's 
returns over the sixty trading days prior to the 
announcement period (day +10 to day -10).
PF: the stock price appreciation measured by the 
cumulative stock returns for the ninety trading days 
period prior to the announcement period (day +10 to day 
-10).
RS: the percentage increase in common stock outstanding 
due to the offering.
CHG: the change in leverage ratio due to the offering. 
SIZE: the offering amount divided by the market value of 
common stock prior to the offering.
TYPE1: a dummy variable which has value 1 for equity 
REITs and 0 for hybrid and mortgage REITs.
TYPE2: a dummy variable which has value 1 for hybrid 
REITs and 0 for equity and mortgage REITs.
CAP: a dummy variable which separates REITs into captive 
and non-captive groups. It has value 1 if the REIT has a 
advisor and has business relationship with the sponsor, 
advisor, or their affiliates, and has value 0 otherwise.
Table 36 (Continued)
BU: a dummy variable which separates REITs into captive 
and non-captive groups. It has value l if the REIT has 
business relationship with the sponsor, advisor, or their 
affiliates, and has value 0 otherwise.
AD: a dummy variable which separates REITs into captive 
and non-captive groups. It has value 1 if the REIT 
employs an advisory and has value 0 otherwise.
Table 37
Ordinary least squares regression results for
equity announcements with CAAR.^ 0 as the dependent
variable using BU as the captivity variable3
Parameter t 
Estimate Statistic










aCAAR_i o; the cumulative average abnormal return
for day -1 to'day 0. For the definition of the
independent variables, see Table 36.
Significant at 95% level
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Table 38
Ordinary least squares regression results for
equity announcements with CAAR„i +1 as the dependent
variable, using BU as the captivity variable3
Parameter t 
Estimate Statistic
Intercept -.0491 -2.061bTV .0032 .881
PF -.0427 -.500
RS .0530 1.162CHG .0968 1.335
SIZE .0949 1.426
TYPE1 -.0258 -1.032
TYPE 2 -.0059 -.233BU .0162 .689
R2 .4845
F-value 1.057
aCAAR_i +1: bbe cumulative average abnormal return for day -1 to'day +1. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 36. 
bSignificant at 95% level.
Table 39
Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables of the 
equity sample / Prob > {R{ under Hq : Rho=0 / N=18a
CAAR_1<0
CAAR . . TV 











































TV .457 .117 -.105 -.136 .284 -.169 -.087 -.226 -.147
.056 .641 .679 .589 .253 .501 .729 .366 .560
PF -.435 .296 -.007 -.005 -.230 -.164 .281 .367
.070 .232 .976 .982 .358 .514 .258 .133
CHG -.597 -.242 .284 .008 -.488 -.504 -.830



































aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 36.
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Appendix A
I:
A test of speculative bubble hypothesis
The speculative bubble hypothesis of IPO pricing 
maintains that the appreciation in stock value on the 
first trading day which causes underpricing is a result 
of speculative trading on that day by investors who did 
not receive an allocation of the issue from the 
underwriter (See, Ritter (1984)). Under this hypothesis, 
underpricing is related to the trading volume of the 
first trading day. Thus the following model is proposed:
Rj_ = ag + a^VOLi +
VOL is the volume of the first trading day which, 
under the speculative bubble hypothesis, indicates the 
speculative trading on the first trading day. The 
occurrence of speculative trading must come from the 
divergence in opinion about the market-clearing price of 
the issue among investors. Thus VOL also reflects the 
degree of divergence in opinion about the market-clearing 
price of the issue on the first trading day. This model 
examines whether there is a significant relationship 
between volume and the initial return. This model is
147
also estimated using weighted least squares. The 
weighing factor is 1/(TVAR*X). VOL is obtained from 
Standard and Poor's Stock Record NYSE, AMEX, and OTC. 
Thirty of the 55 IPOs used in cross-sectional analysis 1 
have data for the first trading day volume, thus the 
sample size for this model is 30.
As shown by the following table, VOL is not 
significant, indicating that underpricing is not the 
result of speculative trading on the first trading day. 
This result does not support the speculative bubble 
hypothesis.
Weighted least squares regression results with 
initial return as the dependent variable3 
(t value in parentheses)
Constant VOL R 2 F-value Observations
0.054 -0.000 0.0135 0.383 30
(0.264) (-0.619)
aThe weighing factor is 1/(TVAR*X), where TVAR is 
the variance of the first 20 trading day returns and X is 
equal to 10,000. VOL is the volume of the first trading day.
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II:
A test for the relationship between the duration 
of a IPO and the first trading day volume
The first trading day volume may be negatively 
related to the duration of the offering. This is because 
the longer the duration, the less the possibility that 
there is demand left over for the issue; in other words, 
the demand is exhausted during the long duration of the 
offering. Hence there must be less speculative trading 
on the first trading day by investors receiving no 
allocations from the underwriters. Thus the following 
model is also tested and the coefficient of DUR is 
predicted to be negative.
VOLj_ = 3q + aj_DURj_ + ej_
The following table shows the results:
Ordinary least square regression results with VOL, 
the volume of the first trading day 
as the dependent variable3
Constant DUR R2 F-value
2,350.50b -167.08c .1843 6.324c
aThe sample size is 30. VOL is the volume of the 
first trading day. DUR is the duration of the offering.
^Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 95% level.
VOL is negatively related to DUR, the time length 
of offerings, as evidenced by the significant and 
negative beta coefficient of DUR. This means that an 
offering which takes a longer time to complete the 
offering process exhibits smaller speculative trading on 
the first trading day. This is because a long offering 
period is likely to exhaust the demand before the stock 
is publicly traded. The sample for this model is the 
same as the sample used to test the speculative bubble 
hypothesis.
Summary statistics of the variables of the 
55-IPO sample weighted by l/(TVAR*X)a
StandardVariables N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
R 55 .0017 .0763 -.2053 .3051LS 55 5.9319 21.4872 .0862 159.3635DUR 55 4.2030 11.1401 . 0 0 0 0 66.2677TYPE1 55 1 * 8766 9.6486 . 0 0 0 0 71.4286TYPE2 55 .0430 .1785 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 2 1 1 1OFF 55 17.0431 69.0663 .2105 513.5389PTG 55 2.0753 9.6321 . 0 0 0 0 71.4286OFT 55 .0858 .4279 . 0 0 0 0 3.0400TIME 55 .2333 .6270 . 0 0 0 0 4.5249INFIN 55 1.9857 9.6350 . 0 0 0 0 71.4286UNAFF 55 2 . 2 0 0 2 9.6264 . 0 0 0 0 71.4286BU 55 .5585 1.2969 . 0 0 0 0 6.9334
aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 6.
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IV:
Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for the weight variables of
the 55-IPO sample / prob>jR| under Hq : Rho=Oa
LS DUR TYPE1 TYPE2 OFF PTG OFT TIME INFIN UNAFF CAP BU AD
R -.019 -.080 .019 .019 -.007 .028 .024 -.145 .027 -.003 .165 .153 .088
.891 .560 .889 .892 .959 .839 .860 .290 .847 .983 .228 .264 .521
LS -.026 .987 -.047 .997 .994 -.010 -.044 .988 .992 .057 .053 .093
.849 .000 .733 .000 .000 .942 .747 .000 .000 .678 .699 .498
DUR -.000 -.085 -.011 -.071 .468 .198 -.044 -.032 .041 .022 .174
.998 .540 .936 .609 .000 .147 .748 .816 .768 .876 .205
TYPE1 -.047 .993 .990 .002 -.007 .955 .990 .042 .039 -.003
.729 .000 .000 .990 .956 .000 .000 .760 .776 .980
TYPE2 -.041 -.033 -.049 -.036 -.047 -.052 .029 .017 -.025
.762 .809 .721 .789 .733 .704 .829 .901 .851
OFF .995 -.004 -.020 .993 .997 .048 .042 .060
.000 .973 .884 .000 .000 .727 .757 .660
PTG -.042 -.071 .994 .992 .026 .022 .042
.756 .603 .000 .000 .848 .870 .759
OFT -.075 -.038 -.001 .229 .218 .167































aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 6.
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V:
Summary statistics of the variables 




R 46 .042 .1459 -.2580 .3770LS 46 2.9990 .9247 .6418 5.4501DUR 46 3.0759 3.4740 . 0 0 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0
TYPE1 46 .3478 .4815 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0TYPE2 46 .1087 .3147 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0OFF 46 7.2363 .1735 6.7771 7.4435PTG 46 .7826 .4170 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0TIME 46 .6087 .4934 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0INFIN 46 .8261 .3832 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0UNAFF 46 .9130 .2849 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0BU 46 .3913 .4934 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0
TVAR 46 .0003846 .0004227 .0000014 . 0 0 2 0
aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 6,
154
VI:
Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for the variables of
the 46-IPO sample / prob>jRj under Hq : RHO=Oa
LS DUR TYPE1 TYPE2 OFF PTG TIME INFIN UNAFF CAP BU AD
R -.032 .163 -.226 .071 .370 -.040 .349 .235 -.074 .113 .128 -.026
.832 .278 .130 .638 .011 .788 .017 .114 .621 .450 .393 .860
LS -.209 -.060 -.009 .076 .364 -.013 -.088 .039 .270 .253 .186
.162 .689 .947 .613 .012 .927 .559 .792 .069 .089 .214
OUR -.224 -.143 .245 -.183 .507 .405 .272 -.119 -.177 -.162
.133 .340 .100 .221 .000 .005 .067 .429 .237 .279
TYPE1 -.255 -.060 .163 -.349 -.026 .063 -.024 .214 -.387
.087 .690 .277 .017 .862 .675 .872 .152 .008
TYPE2 -.036 .164 -.006 -.208 -.140 .149 .085 .160
.810 .220 .967 .164 .353 .321 .573 .287
OFF .057 .539 .263 .203 -.109 -.089 -.009











































aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 6.
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VII:
Summary statistics of the variables of the 
46-IPO sample weighted by l/(TVAR*X)a
StandardVariables N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
R 46 -.0023 .0804 -.2053 .3051LS 46 6.6996 23.4356 .1066 159.3635DUR 46 1.9036 4.7247 . 0 0 0 0 24.8869TYPE1 46 2.1232 10.5388 . 0 0 0 0 71.4286TYPE 2 46 .0514 .1944 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 2 1 1 1OFF 46 19.2062 75.3864 .3616 513.5389PTG 46 2.4613 10.5070 . 0 0 0 0 71.4286TIME 46 .2694 .6799 . 0 0 0 0 4.5249INFIN 46 2.3460 10.5155 . 0 0 0 0 71.4286UNAFF 46 2.5259 10.5056 . 0 0 0 0 71.4286BU 46 .583 1.3560 . 0 0 0 0 6.9334
aFor the definition of the variables, see Table 6.
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VIII:
Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for the weight variables of
the 46-IPO sample / prob>jRj under Hg-. Rho=Oa
LS DUR TYPE1 TYPE2 OFF PTG TIME INFIN UNAFF CAP BU AD
R -.007 -.358 .029 .032 .003 .040 -.143 .036 .006 .200 .190 .109
.962 .014 .843 .828 .981 .787 .340 .809 .963 .181 .204 .466
LS -.049 .987 -.056 .997 .995 -.055 .989 .992 .046 .040 .082
.745 .000 .709 .000 .000 .715 .000 .000 .759 .789 .585
DUR -.017 -.087 -.024 -.066 .718 -.010 -.018 -.039 -.061 -.046
.911 .561 .870 .658 .000 .942 .905 .794 .683 .756
TYPE1 -.054 .993 .992 -.014 .996 .990 .030 .026 -.019
.719 .000 .000 .923 .000 .000 .839 .861 .899






-.061 .026 .010 -.029 







.997 .037 .029 .048 





.993 .023 .017 .042 
.000 .876 .909 .778
OFT -.015
.919
-.022 -.129 -.150 -.167 
.880 .392 .316 .265
TIME .992 .016 .011 -.001 
.000 .910 .940 .995
INFIN .009 .003 .029 
.948 .983 .844





AFor the definition of the variables, see Table 6.
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Average initial returns classified by 
REIT captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-Captive REITs Captive REITs
REIT   Difference in
Captivity N Initial Return N Initial Return N Initial Return Means Test
CAPa 55 0.0524c 32 0.0294 23 0.0845c -0.0551
(2.4029) (1.1695) (2.2300) (-1.2789)
ADb 55 0.0524c 47 0.0511 28 0.0527° -0.0016
(2.4029) (1.7295) (2.1117) (0.0247)
aA REIT is classified as captive if it has business relationship with its sponsor, advisor, 
and/or affiliates and employs an advisor.
A REIT is classified as captive if it employs an advisor.
Significant at 95% level.
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X:
Weighted least squares regression results with the
initial return as the dependent variable,
using the 55-IPO samplea
Parameter t Parameter t
Estimate Statistic Estimate Statistic
Constant .0033 .241 .0073 .565
LS -.0185d -1.963 -.0206° -2.218
DUR .0017 1.297 .0003 .239
TYPE1 - . 0 1 1 1 -.825 .0083 .569TYPE2 -.0300 -.527 -.0160 -.283
OFF -.0024 -.441 -.0025 -.463
PTG .0700b 3.295 .0545b 2 .663
OFT .0314 1.068 .0330 1.147INFIN .0045 .298 .0062 .412
UNAFF -.0047 -.252 -.0051 -.282
TIME .0247 1.095 .0157 .717
CAP .0 2 2 0 ° 2.601
AD .0243b 2.875
R 2 .3679 .3836
F-value 2.275° 2.461°
aThe weighing factor is 1/(TVAR*X), where TVAR is 
the variance of the first 20 trading day returns and X is 
equal to 10,000. The sample size is 55. CAP categorizes a 
REIT into captive group if the REIT has business 
relationships with its affiliates and employs an advisor. 
AD categorizes a REIT into captive group if the REIT uses 
an advisor. For the definition of other independent 
variables, see Table 6 .
Significant at 99% level.
S ig n i f ic a n t  a t  95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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XI:
Weighted least squares regression results with the
initial return as the dependent variable,
using the 46-IPO samplea
Parameter t Parameter t
Estimate Statistic Estimate Statist.
Constant .0161 1.188 .0174 1.353LS -.0158d -1.751 -.0186° -2.147DUR -. 0051d -1.993 -.0066° -2.654TYPE1 -.0148 -1.104 .0071 .497
TYPE2 -.0148 -.271 -.0017 -.031PTG .0360° 2.240 .0248 1.591OFF -.0030 -.560 -.0032 -.622INFIN .0265° 1.761 .0249d 1.731
UNAFF .0091 .496 -.0075 .437
CAP .0229^ 2.805AD .0269b 3.335
R 2 .4757 .5119F-value 3.628b 4.195b
aThe weighing factor is 1/(TVAR*X), where TVAR is 
the variance of the first 20 trading day returns and X is 
equal to 10,000. The sample size is 46. CAP categorizes 
a REIT into captive group if the REIT has business 
relationships with its affiliates and employs an advisor. 
AD categorizes a REIT into captive group if the REIT uses 
an advisor. For the definition of other independent 
variables, see Table 6 .
bSignificant at 99% level.
^Significant at 95% level.
“Significant at 90% level.
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XII:
Weighted least squares regression results with the
initial return as the dependent variable
using the 46-IPO sample and the adjusted modela
Parameter t Parameter t
Estimate Statistic Estimate Statist:
Constant .0150 .997 .0131 .955LS -.0068° -2.258 -.0136b -3.803
DUR -.0 0 9 7 k -2.919 -.0108b -3.484TYPE1 .0150° 2.251 .0300b 3.801
TYPE2 -.0069 - . 1 2 2 -.0015 -.029TIME .0253 1.082 -.0281 1.302CAP .0141d 1.738AD .0262b 3.191
R 2 .2834 .3962
F-value 2.571° 4.265b
aThe weighing factor is 1/(TVAR*X), where TVAR is 
the variance of the first 20 trading day returns, and X 
is equal to 10,000. The sample size is 46. CAP 
categorizes a REIT into captive group if the REIT has 
business relationships with its affiliates and employs an 
advisor. AD categorizes a REIT into captive group if the 
REIT uses an advisor. For the definition of other 
independent variables, see Table 6 .
^Significant at 99% level.
^Significant at 95% level.
^Significant at 90% level.
Appendix B
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt
announcements classified by captivity variable BU
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Debt Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
REIT captivity N CAAR.., q N CAAR_., Q N CAAR.io
Difference in 
Means Tests






Panel B: Line of Credit Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 
Means TestsREIT captivity N CAAR.1 Q N CAAR.1 Q N CAAR-1,0






Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
REIT captivity N CAAR^ Q N CAAR.,, Q N CAAR.io Means Tests










Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt
announcements classified by captivity variable AO
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Debt Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 
Means TestsREIT captivity N CAAR.., Q N CAAR_1 Q N CAAR.io






Panel B: Line of Credit Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 
Means TestsREIT captivity N CAAR.j 0 N CAAR_,j Q N CAAR.io






Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT





aFor the definition of AD, see Table 23.
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III:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt announcements
classified by total variance and REIT captivity
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Debt Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 

















Panel B: Line of Credit Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT

















Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT







32.85<=TV 11 .0038 5 -.0024 6 -.005 .0026
(-.2975) (-.1370) (-.2504) (.0957)
aFor the definition of TV, see Table 23.
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IV:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt announcements
classified by REIT performance and captivity
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Debt Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 

















Panel B: Line of Credit Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 















Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 








2 -.011 6 -.005
(-.2504)
aFor the definition of PF, see Table 23.
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V:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt announcements
classified by REIT leverage ratio and captivity
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Debt Announcements
Total Mon-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 














Panel B: Line of Credit Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 
















Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 











Z.278<=LVG 4 .0063 3 -.0167 1 .075
(.1509) (-.3416)
aFor the definition of LVG, see Table 23.
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Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt announcements
classified by change in leverage ratio and REIT captivity
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Oebt Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 














Panel B:: Line of Credit Announcements
Change in 
Leverage Ratio
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 
















Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Change in 
Leverage Ratio
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 









8.833<=CHG 7 -.0046 6 -.0178 1 .075
(0.1899) (-.7502)
aFor the definition of CHG, see Table 23.
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VII:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt announcements
classified by offering size (dollar) and captivity
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Debt Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 
Means TestsSize (Million) N CAAR.io N CAAR.1>0 N CAAR.io















Panel B: Line of Credit Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 















Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 









25.0<=SIZE 4 .0228a 3 .0263 1 .012
(2.5804) (2.312)
Significant at 90X level.
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VIII:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt announcements
classified by REIT types and captivity
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Debt Announcements
Total Mon-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 
Means TestsREIT Types H CAAR.io M CAAR.io N CAAR.io
















Panel B: Line of Credit Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
REIT Types N CAAR.io N CAAR., Q N CAAR.io Means Tests






Hybrid REITs 6 .0055
(.1667)
2 .082 4 -.0328
(-.3683) -
Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Capt i ve REIT
Difference in 
Means TestsREIT Types N CAAR.io N CAAR., 0 N CAAR., 0








Hybrid REITs 7 .0123 3 -.0053 4 .0255 -.0308
(.7659) (-.1756) (1.4631) (-.9423)
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Average two*day cumulative abnormal returns for debt announcements
classified by announcement year and captivity
(t value in parentheses)
Panel A: Debt Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT















Panel B: Line of Credit Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
















Panel C: Debenture Announcements
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REIT
Difference in 













Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for debt announcements 
classified by types of debt and captivity 
(t value in parentheses)































Ordinary least squares regression results for debt
announcements with CAAR-j^g as the dependent variable,
using AD as the captivity variable3
Parameter t 
Estimate Statistic
Intercept -.0103 -.280TV -.0015b -3.361
PF .0654 1.212LVG -.0016 -.622





aCAAR_i g : the cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day 0. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 23.
Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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XII:
Ordinary least squares regression results for debtannouncements with CAAR_i +i as the dependent variable,













aCAAR_i +i : the cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day +1. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 23.
^Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 95% level.
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XIII:
Ordinary least squares regression results for line of
credit announcements with CAAR_i q as the dependent











aCAAR_1 o : the cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day 0. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 23.
^Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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XIV:
Ordinary least squares regression results for line of
credit announcements with CAAR_^ +1 as the dependent
variable, using AD as the cap'tivity variable3
Parameter t 
Estimate Statistic
Intercept -.0226 -.560TV -.0009 -1.792





aCAAR_1/+1: the cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day +1. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 23.
Significant at 95% level.




Ordinary least squares regression results for debenture
announcements with CAAR_i/0 as the dependent variable,












aCAAR_i 0: the cumulative average abnormal return
for day -1 to'day 0. For the definition of the
independent variables, see Table 23.
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XVI:
Ordinary least squares regression results for debenture
announcements with C A A R _ i a s  the dependent variable,











aCAAR_1 +1: the cumulative average abnormal return
for day -1 to'day +1. For the definition of the
independent variables, see Table 23.
Appendix C
I:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for equity 
announcements classified by captivity variable BU 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
----------------     Difference in
REIT captivity N CAAR., 0 N CAAR., 0 N CAAR., „ Means Tests
BUa 18 -.0188b 10 -.0178° 8 -.0200d .0022
(-3.4871) (-2.7034) (-2.1271) (.1972)
aFor the definition of BU see Table 23. 
Significant at 99% level.
^Significant at 95% level.




Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for equity announcements 
classified by captivity variable CAP and AD 





























.For the definition of CAP and AD see Table 36. 
Significant at 99% level.
^Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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III:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for equity announcements 
classified by total variance and REIT captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
Difference in
Total Variance N CAAR.., g N CAAR., Q N CAAR., Q Means Tests
TV<2.936a 12 -.0242b 6 -.0288° 6 -.0195 -.0093
(-3.3402) (-3.7808) (-1.5252) (-.6270)
2.936<=TV 6 -.008 4 -.0013 2 -.0215
(-1.4462) (-.2381)
aFor the definition of CAP and AD see Table 36.
Significant at 99% level.
Significant at 95% level.
IV:
Average tuo*day cumulative abnormal returns for equity announcements 
classified by REIT performance and captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs



















sFor the definition of PF see Table 36.
Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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V:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for equity announcements 
classified by REIT leverage ratio and captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
Percentage       Difference in
Outstanding N CAAR.^g N CAAR., g N CAAR.., „ Means Tests
RS<.3442a 10 -.0218b 6 -.0188c 4 -.0263c .0075
(-4.6959) (-2.7233) (-4.7099) (.7644)
.3442<=RS 8 -.015 4 -.0163 4 -.0138 -.0025
(-1.3685) (-1.1371) (-.7294) (-.1057)
aFor the definition of RS see Table 36.
Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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VI:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns for equity announcements 
classified by change in leverage ratio and REIT captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
Change in ........................................      Difference in
Leverage Ratio N CAAR.., g N CAAR., g N CAAR., Q Means Tests
CHG<-.1589a 4 -.0285 1 -.041 3 -.0243
(-1.7650) - (-1.1029)
-.1589<=CHG 14 -.016b 9 -.0152b 5 -.0174 .0022
(-2.9768) (-2.2473) (-1.7671) (.1868)
aFor the definition of CHG see Table 36. 
Significant at 90% level.
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VII:
Average tuo-day cumulative abnormal return for equity announcements 
classified by offering size and captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
Offering ----------------  ------------------ ------------- - Difference in
Size N CAAR-1t0 N CAAR*h9 M CAAR.j g Means Tests
SIZE<.2760a 8 -.0235b 5 -.02 3 -.0293b .0093
(-3.1565) (-1.7271) (-4.4675) (.5773)
■2760<=SIZE 10 -.015c 5 -.0156 5 -.0144 -.0012
(-1.9279) (-2.0386) (-.9851) (-.0727)
aFor the definition of SIZE see Table 36.
Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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VIII:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal return for equity announcements 
classified by offering size (dollar) and captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
Offering ..................  — .........................   Difference in
Size (Million) N CAAR,1 Q N CAAR_1 Q N CAAR_1 Q Means Tests
SIZE<25.0 13 -.0176a 7 -.0159 6 -.0183b .0024
(-3.2127) (-1.8273) (-2.9166) (.2239)
25.0<=SIZE 5 -.0234 3 -.0223 2 -.0259
(-1.5854) (-2.1446) (-.5813)
^Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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IX:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal return for equity announcements 
classified by REIT types and captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
Difference in 
Means TestsREIT Types N CAAR.1̂ 0 N CAAR.io N CAAR.1̂ 0
Equity REITs 9 -.0204® 5 -.0182 4 -.0233® .0051
(-3.139) (-1.6730) (-3.2069 ) (.3638)
Mortgage REITs 4 -.0385® 3 -.0287b 1 -.068 .
(-3.2337) (-3.0199) - “
Hybrid REITs 5 .0000 2 -.0005 3 .0003 .
(.0000) (.8752) (-.0302)
^Significant at 95% level. 
Significant at 90% level.
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X:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal return for equity announcements 
classified by announcement year and captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
----------------     Difference in
Year N CAAR.^g N CAAR.J g N CAAR., Q Means Tests
1970s 3 -.037 1 -.035 2 -.038
(-2.1326) - (-1.2667) (.3944)
1980s 15 -.0151® 9 -.0159 6 -.0145
(-2.8619) (-2.255) (-1.6038) (-.1688)
^Significant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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XI:
Average two-day cumulative abnormal return for equity announcements 
classified by REIT affiliation and captivity 
(t value in parentheses)
Total Non-captive REITs Captive REITs
........-..............................      Difference in
Affiliation N CAAR.j g N CAAR.^ Q N CAAR.^ Q Means Tests
Unaffiliated 16 -.0197“ 10 -.0178b 6 -.0228c .0050
REITs (-3.3411) (-2.7035) (-1.8991) (.4018)
Affiliated 2 -.0115 0 - 2 -.0115
REITs (-.7931) - (-.7931)
“significant at 99% level. 
Significant at 95% level, 
“significant at 90% level.
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XII:
Ordinary least squares regression results for equity
announcements with CAAR«^ 0 as the dependent variable,
using CAP and AD as 'the captivity variablea
Parameter t Parameter t
Estimate Statistic Estimate Statistic
Intercept -.0496 -2.945b -.0773 -2.738bTV .0024 .862 .0030 1.161PF .0125 .227 -.0000 -.001RS .0397 1.330 .0408 1.474CHG .0466 .914 .0676 2.059°SIZE .0252 .477 .0449 .935TYPE1 .0012 .082 .0261 1.034TYPE2 .0287 1.625 .0462 2.143cCAP -.0033 -.107
AD .0291 1.185
R2 .5871 .6424 2.213
F-value 1.600 2.021
aCAAR_i q : bbe cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day 0. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 36. 
bSignificant at 95% level.
Significant at 90% level.
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XIII:
Ordinary least squares regression results for
equity announcements with CAAR_1 +1 as the dependent
variable, using CAP and AD as the' captivity variable3
Parameter t Parameter t
Estimate Statistic Estimate Statistic
Intercept -.0414 -1.848b -.0808 -2.129bTV .0039 1.063 .0044 1.275
PF -.0844 -1.154 -.0912 -1.341
RS .0349 .879 .0386 1.039
CHG .0815 1.201 .0787 1.784
SIZE .0959 1.367 .1076 1.667
TYPE1 -.0156 -.779 .0187 .553
TYPE2 -.0006 -.027 .0287 .994




aCAAR_i +]_: the cumulative average abnormal return 
for day -1 to'day +1. For the definition of the 
independent variables, see Table 36.
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